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The world is changing at breathtaking speed. Global challenges, from climate change 
to cyber crime, are growing increasingly complex. Emerging economic powers in Asia 
and Latin America are assuming greater roles in geopolitical matters. The shift of eco-
nomic power to the east is creating new dependencies. In short, the ground rules of 
international cooperation are being rewritten.
The “Global Choices” publication series takes a closer look at these changes and how 
they affect politics, business and society. By facilitating an informed understanding 
of these changes, this series aims to contribute constructively to debates regarding 
the principles of a new global order and the reforms needed to improve international 
cooperation. “Global Choices” is also a call to action because globalization is not a 
matter of immutable fate; its trajectory can be shaped. “Global Choices” therefore 
underscores the fact that the power to make sound choices lies within our hands.
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Overview of the Surveys 7 
Overview of the Surveys 
Helmut Hauschild 
Introduction 
Globalization has brought greater wealth to many. Since the publication of 
American economist Theodore Levitt’s visionary article in the “Harvard 
Business Review” predicting the era of global markets trading standardized 
consumer goods, which brought the concept of globalization to a wider 
audience (Levitt, 1983), global trade has increased more than eightfold (WTO 
2011). Real per capita income (adjusted for inflation) grew by more than 50 
percent over the same period, despite the dramatic increase in the world’s 
population. The thesis proposed almost two centuries ago by British political 
economist David Ricardo – that trade would make participating national 
economies wealthier – has so far proven resoundingly true.  
However, the increasingly close economic ties between countries and 
continents have also resulted in significantly greater risks. Within just a few 
years, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers plunged global financial markets 
into the most serious turmoil since the Great Depression, the excessive 
liabilities of the small eurozone member Greece triggered a sovereign debt 
crisis that threatens the very existence of the European monetary union, and 
an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and a nuclear catastrophe in Japan alerted the 
world to the risks of the seemingly insatiable global demand for energy.  
Has the globalization growth model reached its limits? Have globally net-
worked systems become too complex and ungovernable? Where are the big-
gest risks to be found? And is the political sphere in a position to take the 
necessary countermeasures in time? At the beginning of the second decade of 
the 21st century, the world economy is facing an uncertain future. The number 
and scope of potential dangers has increased, ranging from the loss of 
drinking water reserves in many of the world’s regions, to a possible blackout 
at the very heart of globalization, the Internet. Furthermore, some risks have 
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probably not yet even been identified as such.1 The growing mutual 
interdependence between national economies has significantly increased the 
risk of contagion should undesirable developments occur. Regional crises have 
become global risks.  
It is evident that national governments are no longer able to overcome the 
challenges of globalization single-handedly. However, when it comes to multi-
lateral attempts at providing solutions, the track record gives little cause for 
hope. Despite decades of negotiations, the prospects of a new global climate 
protection agreement are poor, the Doha world trade-negotiation round, a 
source of hope for developing nations it when began ten years ago, has to all 
intents and purposes failed. Even the G20 group of the 20 most important 
industrialized and emerging countries has disappointed the high hopes initially 
invested in it.  
These developments prompted the Bertelsmann Stiftung to address the is-
sue of current and future risks to the global economy, with the aim of 
developing effective risk management strategies before it is too late. The 
present publication is based on the results of a worldwide survey of politicians, 
economic leaders, scholars and representatives of civil society organizations. It 
was carried out in cooperation with Z_punkt The Foresight Company, a 
consultancy focused on strategic future issues. The results provide information 
about how decision makers and experts from 35 countries view the risk to the 
worldwide economy in coming years and how likely they consider successful 
risk management at a global level to be. Data was collected for eleven risk 
areas, each of which covers multiple individual and interdependent risks.2 
 
 
1 See the contribution “Globalization and its Complexity” by Jan Arpe. 
2 See the contribution “Risk Concept, Selection of Risk Areas and Expert Survey 
Methodology” by Holger Glockner and Tim Volkmann, which describes in detail the 
method used to select the eleven risk areas. 
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Structure of the survey 
The eleven risk areas were selected in a multi-stage procedure on the basis 
of 20 global megatrends, such as population trends and climate change fore-
casts.  
Table 1: The eleven risk areas in the surveys of expert and public opinion 
 
 
The expert opinion survey took place from 20 May to 13 June 2011. The 
participants, who were selected in advance, were given access during this 
period to a detailed online questionnaire. Seventy experts and decision makers 
from Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Latin America, and Oceania took part 
in the survey. 
Participants answered the same eleven questions on each of the eleven risk 
areas. In seven of those questions, respondents were asked to provide a 
quantitative assessment on a scale of 1 to 6 and on another question they were 
asked to provide an assessment on a scale of -2 to +2. Three of the questions 
allowed participants to provide a qualitative evaluation of the risk area (light 
blue). 
Food and water scarcity
Energy and resource scarcity
Socioeconomic inequality
Uncontrolled mass migration
International terrorism
Aging societies
Sovereign debt/default
Financial market collapse
Protectionism/trade wars
Pandemic outbreaks
Technology infrastructure failure
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Table 2: The questionnaire for the expert opinion survey 
 
 
 
Indicator Question
Potential 
global impact
How high is the potential impact of risk area xxx on the global 
economy? 
Regional 
impact
How high is the potential impact on your country of origin in relation to 
that on the global economy? 
Key 
consequence
What is the most serious consequence of risk xxx taking effect? 
Priority
Internationally, what priority should be given to finding an effective 
means of averting or mitigating the risks of xxx?
Comprehension
How well are the causes, mechanisms and possible effects of risk area xxx 
understood by global decision-making elites? 
Level of 
concern
How high is the level of concern regarding risk area xxx among global 
decision-making elites?
Solution 
probablity
How probable is it that an effective means of averting or mitigating the 
effects of risk area xxx will be found?
Risk 
management
How effectively are global decision-making elites addressing risk area 
xxx?
Key barriers
What stands most in the way of finding an effective means of averting or 
mitigating the effects of risk area xxx?  
Consensus on 
measures
How strong is the consensus among global decision-making elites on the 
appropriate measures to be taken to avert or minimize the effects of risk 
area xxx?
Risk-mitigation 
measures
Which measure is most effective in addressing the potential impact of 
risk area xxx on the global economy?
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In Germany, there was also a representative survey of public opinion 
regarding the eleven risk areas. From 22 June to 24 July 2011, the infas 
Institute for Applied Social Sciences, acting on behalf of the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, asked a total of 1,011 people aged 18 and over about the probability 
of the eleven risk areas occurring and the impact this would have on their 
lives. An overview of the results is shown at the end of the next chapter and 
the details are presented in subsequent chapters. 
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The results of the worldwide survey of experts 
Potential impact on the global economy 
The experts and decision makers surveyed identify multiple, simultaneous 
risks to the global economy, with severe potential impact (Fig. 1). They expect 
the most serious damage from a global collapse of financial markets, followed 
by energy and resource scarcity. In third place comes sovereign debt and 
default of a major economy. 
The international experts and decision makers consider the global economy 
to be vulnerable in all eleven risk areas, making it susceptible to crisis. In all 
eleven risk areas, the replies concerning the expected economic impact score 
significantly higher than the average of 3.5 on a scale from 1 (very low) to 6 
(very high). 
Fig. 1: Potential impact of risk areas on global economy (all respondents) 
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If we compare the potential economic impact in the respondents’ country of 
origin to the potential impact expected worldwide, we find significant regional 
deviations from the global average in most of the eleven risk areas. Decision 
makers and experts from the developed, industrialized nations of Europe, 
North America and Asia (OECD countries) see the main threat to their 
national economies in their aging societies, crises in the financial markets and 
protectionism (Fig. 2). 
Respondents from developing and emerging countries (non-OECD states) 
expect their national economies to suffer from food and water crises, 
international terrorism, scarcity of energy and resources and the consequences 
of socioeconomic inequality (Fig. 3). One striking aspect is that representatives 
of non-OECD states appraise the potential economic damage to their 
countries as higher overall than representatives of the developed industrialized 
nations. 
Fig. 2: Economic impact on the respondent’s country of origin in relation to the impact 
on the global economy (respondents from OECD countries) 
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Fig. 3: Economic impact on the respondent’s country of origin in relation to the impact 
on the global economy (respondents from non-OECD countries) 
 
 
Urgency of global risk prevention measures 
The survey sends out a clear message: the international community needs to 
take action soon, and implement measures to avoid and protect against risk. 
The decision makers and experts questioned assign all eleven risk areas an 
above-average priority on the international agenda (Fig. 4). The average score 
for each of the eleven risk areas, assessed on a scale of 1 to 6, is over 3.5. 
From the point of view of the respondents, the most urgent issues are 
measures to avoid a worldwide energy and resources crisis, as well as ensuring 
food supply and drinking water reserves. Tied for third place are the risk of a 
growing gap between rich and poor and the risk of a collapse of the financial 
markets.  
The risk posed by national debt, currently dominating the headlines because 
of the euro crisis, comes in a somewhat distant fifth. However, it is worth 
considering here that the survey took place in June 2011. Given the escalation 
of the euro crisis in the second half of 2011, it is conceivable that the 
respondents would now give greater priority to finding a solution to the 
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problem of sovereign debt. At the time the questionnaire was completed, the 
emerging and developing countries were still hardly feeling the effects of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. The representatives of non-OECD states 
considered the economies of their countries of origin to be comparatively 
unaffected by the risk of excessive national debt, rating it tenth, as seen in 
Figure 3. By the start of 2012, the situation had fundamentally changed. The 
global drop in demand caused by the euro debt crisis is now also slowing 
down the economies of emerging and developing countries. Some of these, 
such as Brazil, found themselves in recession at the start of 2012 for the 
second time since the global financial crisis began. 
Fig. 4: Recommended priorities in averting/mitigating risks (all respondents) 
 
 
Respondents considered all top-five rated risk areas to be of more or less 
equal urgency in terms of the need for the international community to agree 
on solution strategies. There are two explanations for this: 
Firstly, the global economy’s weakened resistance to crisis. After the crises 
of recent years, governments in Europe and the United States have 
significantly diminished financial and political reserves for handling further 
crises. Another financial market crash, an oil price shock caused by the Iran 
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conflict or a sovereign default would have a major potential impact, with 
disastrous effects on an already stricken world economy. For this reason, the 
respondents consider it essential to minimize these risks.  
Secondly, all five of the prioritized risk areas, as drivers of other global risks, 
are of major economic significance. For example, the availability of reserves of 
fresh water has a considerable influence on food production and even power 
generation, because power plants need cooling water, for instance. This means 
that water scarcity can also play an important role in the occurrence of famine 
and temporary failures in the electricity supply. Or, to take another example, 
financial markets: default by a eurozone country and the resultant withdrawal 
of private credit would severely exacerbate the risk of another highly indebted 
eurozone country declaring insolvency. 
Probability of successfully averting/mitigating risk 
The world is not completely at the mercy of these global risks. The decision 
makers and experts surveyed are cautiously optimistic that, in the case of 
seven of the eleven risk areas, there is a good chance that suitable preventive 
and safeguarding measures can be employed to successfully reduce the 
potential risk to the global economy (Fig. 5). This includes the three risk areas 
that the respondents consider to be the greatest potential source of economic 
damage: collapse of the global financial markets, sovereign default, and food 
and water scarcity. 
Nevertheless, for some of the risks, the respondents differed considerably 
on the chances of finding solutions, determined largely by where the 
respondents came from. For example, decision makers and experts from 
industrialized nations were far more optimistic than respondents from non-
OECD states that large sovereign debt can be brought under control (Fig. 6). 
Admittedly, this could be seen as premature praise: the current debt crisis 
primarily affects Europe, Japan and the United States. 
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Fig. 5: Probability of averting/mitigating risks in the future (all respondents) 
 
Fig. 6: Probability of averting/mitigating risks in the future (respondents from  
 OECD countries) 
 
Decision makers and experts from developing and emerging countries have 
far less confidence that the industrialized nations have the strength and 
determination to balance their budgets (Fig. 7). They consider a solution to the 
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problem of sovereign debt to be “somewhat improbable.” On the other hand, 
respondents from developing and emerging countries are markedly more 
optimistic than those from industrialized nations as regards a solution to the 
problems of energy and resource scarcity, terrorism and the failure of 
infrastructures of systemic importance. 
Fig. 7: Probability of averting/mitigating risks in the future (respondents from  
 non-OECD countries) 
 
 
All respondents are most skeptical about the possibility of minimizing the 
causes of uncontrolled mass migration and, by extension, curtailing mass 
migration itself. International flows of refugees are seen as the consequence of 
other risks, such as water and food crises, and they can therefore only be 
indirectly stemmed. The respondents also consider solutions to the problems 
of socioeconomic inequality in the world to be rather unlikely. The risk of 
growing inequality between the rich and the poor not only affects the 
developing and emerging nations but increasingly also the industrialized states.  
A recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) concludes that the income gap has widened in almost 
every Western industrialized country over the past decade (OECD 2011). As 
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such, there is a paradox at the heart of globalization: as the world grows closer 
economically, it is growing apart socially. 
Quality of risk management 
The survey shows a clear correlation between the probability of successful 
risk prevention or mitigation (Fig. 5) and the quality of risk management (Fig. 
8). The more negatively the decision makers and experts evaluate the political 
approach to avoiding a risk and safeguarding against its effects, the more 
pessimistic they are about the probability of actually averting the risk and its 
expected consequences. This is particularly true of the risks posed by 
uncontrolled mass migration, food and water scarcity and socioeconomic 
inequality: all three risks score the worst in terms of both the probability of 
finding a solution and risk management. 
Fig. 8: Quality of risk management for the risk areas (all respondents) 
 
Overall, the survey suggests that risk management around the world is of 
moderate quality, at best. The most positive assessment is given to the areas of 
terrorism and financial markets. But even here, risk management only achieves 
a score of “somewhat effective.” While the probability of successfully averting 
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or limiting the damage of a financial markets crisis comes in first, terrorism is 
placed only seventh. 
One of the many prerequisites for successful risk management is for those 
involved to understand the causes, mechanisms and effects of each risk (Fig. 
9). Overall, the decision makers and experts are cautiously optimistic in this 
area. All eleven risk areas rank above the scale’s average value of 3.5. Those 
surveyed believe that the risks of aging societies, energy and resource scarcity, 
and protectionism are the best understood. The respondents reserve their 
greatest criticism for the comprehension of uncontrolled mass migration. 
Fig. 9: Comprehension of risk areas on the part of global decision-making elites (all 
respondents) 
 
However, a proper understanding of the problem is in itself no guarantee of 
successful risk management. This also requires consensus between the 
international parties involved regarding the measures for averting, mitigating 
and safeguarding against risks (Fig. 10). Respondents fundamentally 
differentiated between short-term and long-term countermeasures. In their 
view, short-term measures should be aimed at minimizing economic damage 
that has already occurred or is imminent. Long-term measures, by contrast, 
should aim to alter the behavior of consumers and enterprises, for example by 
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changing incentive structures and creating new measures of well-being that are 
less narrowly focused on economic growth. 
Fig. 10: Global decision-making elite consensus on appropriate risk-mitigation measures 
(all respondents) 
 
 
The respondents are noticeably pessimistic when it comes to assessing the 
chances of a global consensus on appropriate countermeasures for almost all 
the risk areas. The experts identify particular disagreement when it comes to 
risks that can be mitigated or averted only by sharing the burden between the 
parties involved, making it difficult to agree on who should bear which costs. 
Influx of refugees falls into this category, for example. This situation 
frequently triggers international dispute about who is responsible for receiving 
the refugees. Efforts to alleviate social inequality often falter on the issue of 
financing social equalization. Food and water crises lead to conflicts about the 
use of rivers that cross national borders. For these risks, the decision makers 
and experts see the worst prospects of consensus on risk management. 
Coping with the risks of sovereign debt, systemic financial market crises and 
scarcity of energy and resources is also highly dependent on whether it is 
possible for all those involved to agree on an acceptable sharing of the burden. 
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As elsewhere, the respondents perceive less agreement on suitable solution 
strategies for these risks. The serious conflicts that are currently being waged 
at a global level regarding measures to reduce these risks tend to confirm the 
pessimism identified in the survey.  
The respondents see slightly better chances of a global consensus being 
reached on measures to counter the risks of protectionism and trade wars, 
even though conflicts about sharing the economic consequences of free trade 
are built into these issues. One reason for the greater optimism here could be 
that an internationally recognized institution for settling disputes already exists 
– the World Trade Organization – which is not the case with the risk areas 
mentioned above. The survey identifies the greatest consensus on the subject 
of terrorism. Here, it would seem from the responses, every state feels equally 
threatened and risk management is similar across the board. 
The greatest obstacle to effective risk management at a global level identified 
by the respondents, in almost every risk area, is politics. They all deplore an 
unwillingness to reach political consensus. The exception to this is the risk of a 
pandemic, where half of those surveyed identify a lack of knowledge as the 
biggest obstacle. When it comes to the risk of systemic infrastructure failing, 
limited awareness of the problem and political disagreement are listed as the 
key impediments to successful risk prevention or minimization. The most 
important barrier to successful risk management of energy and resource 
scarcity is also, in the eyes of most respondents, political disagreement, 
although 30 percent identify a lack of appropriate technology as the principal 
obstacle. 
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Reciprocities between risks 
Many of the eleven risk areas influence each other. The survey addresses 
these reciprocities by asking international decision makers and experts about 
the most serious consequences, for each risk area, should that risk occur. In 
many instances they point to exacerbation of other risk areas. From the 
answers supplied by the experts and decision makers, two risk clusters 
characterized by strong interdependence emerge (Fig. 11). 
The “threatened livelihoods” cluster is largely made up of the risk areas food 
and water scarcity, socioeconomic gaps and uncontrolled mass migration. 
Those consulted believed that the risk of terrorism was closely related to these 
other risk areas. The risks of energy and resource scarcity and aging societies 
exacerbate the “endangered livelihoods” cluster.  
The “macroeconomic gaps” cluster largely comprises the risk areas systemic 
financial market collapse, sovereign debt/default of a major economy and 
protectionism/trade wars. The risks in the “macroeconomic gaps” cluster 
would also be exacerbated by the effects of energy and resource scarcity as 
well as aging societies.  
There are also reciprocities between the two clusters. Thus, high sovereign 
debt can deepen the divide between rich and poor in a society because the 
public sector is not in a position to reduce income differentials through state 
welfare payments. 
The “threatened livelihoods” cluster represents a risk nexus typical in many 
developing and emerging countries. Poorer social groups find it harder to 
access food sources and water supplies, which are often insufficient in these 
countries. Population growth and reduced fresh water reserves increase supply 
problems and consequently increase the divide between rich and poor. The 
United Nations predicts that by 2050, worldwide demand for food will 
increase by 70 percent, energy demand by 40 percent. An increase in food and 
energy production means higher fresh water consumption. According to these 
forecasts, two-thirds of the world’s population will live in regions with 
insufficient water reserves by 2030. At the same time, ever more agricultural 
land will be used for energy generation measures, such as the cultivation of 
energy crops. 
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Fig. 11: Major reciprocities between risk areas 
 
 
 
Failure to increase agricultural productivity and reduce water and energy 
consumption will increase the risk of famine and deepen the divide between 
the richest and poorest population groups. One probable consequence of 
insufficient food and water supply as well as socioeconomic discrimination is 
an increased flow of international refugees. These uncontrolled waves of 
migration are in turn associated with the risk of a growing socioeconomic gap 
in receiving countries, which are also usually themselves developing and 
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emerging countries. The threat of a vicious cycle looms – poverty, flight and 
renewed poverty. Socioeconomic discrimination and social exclusion often 
affect ethnic and religious minorities. This creates a breeding ground for 
political and religious extremism which can, in its most acute form, foster 
terrorism.  
In most cases, the risks at the heart of the “threatened livelihoods” cluster 
are relatively slow to intensify. Those who are most affected, as in the case of 
water and food crises, tend to be poorer population groups without a strong 
lobby. Political decision makers at the global level are therefore under 
comparatively little pressure to act. This leads to low scores in risk 
management and a greater likelihood that solutions will aim at reducing the 
potential for damage in the global economy. The risk areas of mass migration, 
insufficient supplies of food and drinking water as well as socioeconomic gaps 
achieved the poorest scores in terms of solution opportunities and risk 
management in the respondents’ opinion. Decision makers and experts believe 
there should be a higher priority given to finding solutions for most problems 
in the “endangered livelihoods” cluster to break the vicious cycle within this 
cluster.  
The risks in the “macroeconomic gaps” cluster are directly apparent in the 
global economy in the form of high prices. They affect population groups with 
much greater political influence and tend to manifest more often in sudden, 
drastic crises than the risks in the “threatened livelihoods” cluster. This is 
especially true of the risk of collapse in global financial markets and the risk of 
highly indebted countries becoming insolvent. Decision makers and experts 
see a close link between the two. They also have the potential to rapidly 
impact on the global economy. Therefore they receive much more attention 
on the global political agenda than the insidiously worsening risks in the 
“threatened livelihoods” cluster. 
The central causes in the “macroeconomic gaps” risk cluster are high 
economic growth rates and significant cash reserves in emerging markets, 
above all China, and comparatively low growth rates coupled with massive 
public and sometimes private debt in industrialized countries. 
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The expansive monetary policies implemented by central banks throughout 
the industrialized regions (United States, eurozone, Japan) has led to excessive 
global liquidity which has formed the basis of “itinerant speculative bubbles” 
(Hoffmann, Schnabl, 2009). Complex financial products with highly opaque 
risk structures have encouraged these speculative bubbles and associated risk 
of sudden, drastic losses in value which could lead to a collapse of the global 
financial system. 
Events of recent years have demonstrated the mutually reinforcing 
reciprocities between financial market crises and sovereign debt crises. The 
looming collapse of the financial market following the insolvency of U.S. 
investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 forced the governments 
of the United States and the EU member states to allocate billions to saving 
banks of systemic importance to prevent collapse of financial systems in their 
countries, which might have pulled the entire real economy down with it. This 
scenario may well have occurred if crisis-ridden banks had withheld essential 
credit from companies across the board. 
While most economists agree that rescuing banks of systemic importance 
prevented a worse recession in the short term, it also led to a dramatic increase 
in national debt in the United States and most European countries, which was 
already very high. The financial crisis was thus a major factor in the financial 
markets’ loss of confidence in European government bonds, and a significant 
trigger for the current European sovereign debt crisis. Creditors suddenly 
doubted the ability of several eurozone countries to pay back their debts. 
Despite intervention by eurozone countries and the European Central Bank 
amounting to hundreds of billions of euros, in early 2012 it is still not certain if 
all eurozone countries will remain in the single currency. Worldwide economic 
prospects have significantly deteriorated as a result of the euro crisis. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned of a looming global recession in 
December 2011, along with the danger of a worldwide economic downturn 
increasing protectionism in global trade (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
2011). The IMF’s diagnosis underscores the results of the survey, which 
suggests close reciprocities between the three risk areas of financial crisis, 
sovereign debt and protectionism. 
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Closely connected with the “macroeconomic gaps” cluster is the risk area of 
aging societies. Aging populations in Western industrialized countries result in 
a reduction in the work force coupled with a greater number of pensioners. 
Fewer tax and welfare contributions payers are therefore obliged to finance 
greater demands on state pensions, health systems and care facilities. For most 
industrialized Western nations, maintaining current social policy quickly 
increases debt and consequently leads to even greater global macroeconomic 
imbalance with the emerging countries of Asia, Latin America and, in the long 
term, Africa, with its significantly younger population. The greater the 
sovereign debt, however, the lower the budgetary capacity to finance social 
benefits, further increasing the divide between rich and poor. This links the 
risk fields of aging societies and sovereign debt to the “threatened livelihoods” 
cluster. 
Scarcity of energy and raw materials could exacerbate the global 
macroeconomic gap. They increase the risk of protectionist measures and 
foster trade imbalances: Countries with minimal energy resources and raw 
materials are dependent on expensive imports, with the corollary danger of 
habitual trade deficits. Countries rich in energy and raw materials export at 
high prices and regularly record trade surpluses. The risk of sovereign debt can 
also increase if governments try to artificially lower prices of energy and raw 
materials with state subsidies. Developing and emerging nations in particular 
are often confronted with a dilemma. If they stop subsidizing higher energy 
prices, the poor can no longer afford energy and the risk of a socioeconomic 
gap increases. Expensive energy and raw materials also have negative 
consequences for agricultural yields because the use of fertilizer, for example, 
decreases, and the cost of operating irrigation pumps increases.  
According to the decision makers and experts, the risk area of energy and 
raw material scarcity is a central driver in endangering livelihoods as well as 
worsening the macroeconomic gap. Respondents acknowledge this central 
status in the interaction of risk areas by nominating energy and resource 
scarcity as the risk area with the second-highest potential for damage in the 
global economy, and the highest among those requiring urgent risk-reduction 
measures. 
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The experts believe other risk areas barely influence the probability of 
technology infrastructure failure and pandemic outbreaks occurring. These 
risks occur suddenly and have drastic effects. Both the probability of their 
occurrence and their potential for damage are, in the view of decision makers 
and experts, beset with major uncertainty. In the survey they rate knowledge 
about causes and consequences of global pandemics and systemic 
infrastructure failure as relatively low. There is also little reciprocity with the 
two central clusters of other risk areas. The dangers for globalization through 
highly infectious diseases and the failure of essential networks such as the 
Internet and logistics chains haven’t yet been sufficiently researched. A 
knowledge base must first be created before any successful risk management 
can be implemented. 
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Risk perception in the German public 
The majority of Germans think it is very probable that almost all of the 
eleven global risks will come to pass (Fig. 12). While they see themselves as 
less likely to be affected, they expect significant consequences for their 
personal lives if these risks occur (Fig. 13). This is shown in a public opinion 
poll commissioned by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and conducted by opinion 
pollsters infas. 
Germans believe that the greatest impact on their personal lives will come 
from a worldwide energy and raw materials crisis. A total of 76 percent of 
respondents assess the consequences for themselves as “very high” or 
“somewhat high.” Moreover, the large majority of Germans fear that an 
energy and raw material crisis will in fact occur. A total of 92 percent regard it 
as “very probable” or “somewhat probable” that energy and essential raw 
materials will become “scarce and increasingly expensive.” 
They regard the further growth in the divide between rich and poor as 
equally probably. But here Germans are less likely to see themselves as 
personally affected. In any case almost every second German continues to 
believe that increased imbalance in the world will also have significant 
consequences for their own lives. 
Germans also consider a sovereign default, with drastic consequences for 
the provision of public services, a stock market crash caused by the bursting 
of a speculative bubble as well as increasing scarcity of water and food as very 
probable. In the export nation of Germany, the least probable occurrence is 
held to be the outbreak of a trade war. The extent to which the respondent 
would be personally affected is also regarded as relatively low, although the 
German labor market is dependent to a large degree on global trade. 
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Fig. 12:  Probability of occurrence in the eleven risk areas: percentage of assessment of 
“very probable” and “somewhat probable” 
 
 
 
Note: Respondents (German public) had four options to choose from in assessing impact: 
 very probable – somewhat probable – somewhat improbable – very improbable. 
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Fig. 13: Impact on personal life in case of risk occurring: percentage of assessment of 
“very high” or “somewhat high” 
 
 
 
Note: Respondents (German public) had four options to choose from in assessing impact: 
 very high – somewhat high – somewhat low – very low. 
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Comparing the answers regarding probability of occurrence with the 
expected impact on personal lives shows that whereas respondents regard 
many risks as very probable, they see themselves as less likely to be impacted. 
The following graphic shows this clearly (Fig. 14). 
Fig. 14: Probability of occurrence and personal impact: Comparison of summarized 
answer frequency for “probable occurrence” and “high impact”; difference in 
percent 
 
 
Note: The bars summarize both upper answer options from Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 as a percentage. 
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Germans see the greatest discrepancy between probability of occurrence and 
personal impact in the growing divide between rich and poor, international 
flow of refugees as well as water and food crises. But even the risk of a 
national default, which due to the debt crisis in the eurozone was rated very 
highly and is more or less at hand, fewer members of the public expect a “very 
high” or “somewhat high” impact on their personal lives. 
While Germans see high risks for the global economy, far fewer expect 
major personal impact. The public is significantly more optimistic than 
decision makers and experts from developed, industrialized countries (OECD 
countries). They believe that the costs for industrialized nations will be 
significantly higher than the global average for the risk areas of sovereign debt, 
financial market crisis, aging societies and failure of systemic infrastructure. If 
they’re right, then the potential damage to Germany if these risks occur is 
particularly high. Politics and business in German should take this as a wake-
up call. They should ensure that they place particular emphasis on successful 
risk management measures – especially in these four risk areas. 
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The Results, in Detail 
Holger Glockner, Thieß Petersen, Andreas Schaich 
The following eleven sub-chapters present in detail the results of both the 
expert and public opinion surveys for each risk area. Each section is structured 
in the same manner.  
Each sub-chapter begins with facts and figures, in which the underlying data 
describing the state of a given risk is provided and key statements, in which the 
expert survey results are summarized. This is followed by sections assessing 
first the experts’ views on the global relevance of a risk area and, second, their 
opinion regarding the comprehension of a problem and potential risk-mitigation 
measures. Each sub-chapter concludes with a summary of public opinion in 
Germany regarding the risk area in question. 
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Food and water scarcity 
 
Facts and figures 
Die According to United Nations forecasts, the world’s population will 
climb from a current total of 7 billion people to 7.66 billion in 2020 and to 
9.31 billion in the year 2050. In 1990, by comparison, the planet had 5.31 
billion occupants (UN 2010). 
This continued growth in the world’s population also increases global 
demand for water and food. Nonetheless reserves, particularly of drinking 
water, have remained at essentially the same levels. This means that between 
1992 and 2007 the amount of accessible, renewable fresh water reserves 
dropped by 17.5 percent per person (World Bank 2010). 
Arable land is also limited and in many emerging nations, in particular, its 
use is increasingly contested by the competing land needs of growing 
populations, expanding cities and industrialization. While the arable 
proportion of the world’s land increased from 34.2 percent in 1961 to 38 
percent in 2000, it has since dropped steadily to its current proportion of 37.6 
percent. Farmland amounts to just 11.7 percent of the world’s land surface, 
with no appreciable increase since the late 1980s (FAO 2011). 
Regularly recurring famines and droughts such as those which affected the 
Horn of Africa in 2011 are a tragic indication of the consequences of food and 
water scarcity. Along with the natural borders of fresh-water areas and 
agricultural land, institutional factors ply a major role here, including 
misappropriation of funds intended for infrastructure projects and corruption 
which undermines trust in state institutions.  
The effects of climate change are likely to worsen already difficult supply 
conditions, especially in the world’s least developed countries. The 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forecasts an increase in 
flooding and droughts with an adverse impact on food production (IPC 2007). 
Anthropogenic environmental pollution caused, for example, by extraction 
of mineral resources in contravention of environmental standards, can also 
have a catastrophic effect on supplies of clean drinking water and agricultural 
cultivation, at the local level at least. 
These problems lead to malnutrition and a further growth in poverty-related 
illnesses in the affected regions. Inhabitants are often forced to orient their 
resources to pure survival, weakening their economic power in the long term 
and greatly reducing their future prospects. 
Rising food and water prices have the greatest negative impact on the 
poorest levels of society – the consequence of an increasing social gap within 
the societies in question. If the desertification of fertile land increases 
significantly, regional and international battles for agricultural land and water 
supplies can no longer be ruled out. 
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Key statements on “food and water scarcity” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
The experts’ view of risks associated with food and water crises are highly 
diverse in comparison with results from other risk areas. Overall they attribute 
a medium level of potential impact for the global economy, but were far from 
united in their assessments (Fig. 1).  
Fig. 1: Impact of food and water crises on the global economy: 
 percentage distribution of respondents’ assessments  
 
 
Experts from wealthy OECD regions assess the problem as having far less 
economic impact than their counterparts in non-OECD countries. Of the 
latter, 85 percent believe the problem has a high or very high potential impact. 
As expected, experts from non-OECD countries regard their respective 
homelands as far more affected than OECD experts (Fig. 2). However, the 
respondents largely agree that the problem of food and water scarcity urgently 
requires a swift solution. 
As for the open question of the gravest economic consequences of food and 
water crises, responses confirm the relevance that respondents ascribe to the 
topic. At the same time, they perceive the risk area as strongly regional in 
nature. 
Immediate consequences in the affected regions frequently cited by the 
experts include loss of economic performance, worsening of general health 
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conditions and, particularly in less developed countries, an increase in social 
inequality. This leads to resource allocation conflicts which could result in 
social unrest or even a loss of political stability. 
Fig. 2:  Impact of food and water crises on respondents’ country of origin compared 
 to impact on global economy: percentage distribution of respondents’ 
assessments 
 
 
Many experts cite distribution problems and unequal economic and social 
participation as a primary cause of food and drinking water scarcity, thus 
highlighting two dimensions of the term “scarcity.” Scarcity in the sense of an 
actual shortage must be differentiated from structural or even artificial forms 
of scarcity. The experts regard countries and regions with weak economic, 
political and social structures as far more susceptible to shortages of drinking 
water and food than more stable countries. 
The respondents regard the probability of water shortages and food scarcity 
as closely related to factors like quality of political leadership and the 
institutional framework. However this by no means indicates that 
consequences are confined to the regional level. For instance, the majority of 
respondents expect such outcomes as an increased gap between the world’s 
rich and poor, increase in political conflicts and migration, and a greater 
terrorist threat. Some respondents associate water scarcity with a threat of war. 
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At the same time, survey participants foresee increased compartmentalization 
of markets in the agricultural sector and an increase in trade conflicts. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures  
The experts interviewed rate the topic of food and water scarcity as the 
second most urgent risk area and see a pressing need for action (Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3: Recommended priorities in averting/mitigating risks (all respondents) 
 
 
According to respondents, however, this urgency stands in stark contrast to 
comprehension of the problem among the decision-making elite and their 
determination to find a solution. Food and water crises come last in the scale 
of concern (Fig. 4). According to respondents, topics such as international 
terrorism and financial market crises were of far greater concern to decision 
makers. 
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Fig. 4:  Level of concern about the risk areas on the part of global decision-making 
elites (all respondents)  
 
 
How can we explain this low level of concern? A lack of knowledge and 
associated underestimation of the problem are clearly not the cause. Survey 
participants feel that the causes, effects and consequences of food and water 
crises are generally understood. As this risk represents a problem above all for 
developing and emerging nations, it is possible that the experts interviewed 
have the industrialized nations’ decision-making elite in mind when they 
assume a low level of concern. 
This assumption accords with their assessment of potential economic 
impact: experts from OECD countries rate the risk area as far less dangerous 
than do their colleagues from non-OECD countries. 
Responses regarding the quality of worldwide efforts to reduce the risk of 
food and water shortages follow the same pattern. These risks are regarded by 
respondents as very low in comparison to other risk areas. Despite the basic 
level of understanding as to the causes and interdependency of food and water 
scarcity, the experts interviewed rate the probability of a solution with an 
average of 3.44, just under the middle of the scale (3.5). This stems from a lack 
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of political consensus: almost three quarters of the respondents cite this as the 
leading cause. 
The respondents believe that solutions which will reduce the risk of food 
and water crises require globally coordinated action, while the effects remain 
regionally confined to non-OECD countries and so the major decision makers 
in the most developed societies are not unduly concerned. The greater the 
political disagreement, the more negatively the respondents regard solution 
efforts already undertaken.  
There are noticeable differences of opinion among the experts in the case of 
food and water crises. Approximately the same number of participants regard 
a future solution as very improbable as those who see it as very probable. 
There is a very clear differentiation according to the profession of the 
respondent: Whereas politicians see food and water crises in a very negative 
light, those with a business background are far more optimistic about a future 
solution. 
Most experts are of the opinion that fighting corruption and increasing 
distributive justice worldwide are the best solution strategies. Interviewees see 
opportunities to overcome purely subsistence-based economies in the 
establishment of local economic cycles in line with the “bottom of the 
pyramid” principle. This maintains that inhabitants of the largest and poorest 
socioeconomic level in developing and emerging nations, who live on less than 
two dollars a day, should be regarded as fully valid consumers and re-educated 
so that they might become small business operators.  
On the global level, the majority of experts call for stronger participation in 
global trade for weaker market participants and easier market access for 
developing nations. They see traditional, short-term-oriented development aid 
as an ineffective means of solving the problem as it offers no prospects for 
sustainable economic development. According to the experts, long-term 
solutions can only be found if politics and business work in tandem. 
Concrete proposals focus on the global development agenda and 
internationally binding regulations for world trade and credit as well as a more 
sustainable framework for development cooperation. Survey participants cited 
global institutions such as the WTO and the World Bank by name.  
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Other proposed solutions include improving education in the affected 
regions and expanded knowledge transfer from industrialized countries to 
developing and emerging nations. Some participants called for an end to water 
privatization. Technological approaches, such as high-yield, disease-resistant 
seeds, could also contribute to a solution according to some experts. 
Public opinion in Germany 
Of the members of the German public canvassed by infas, 77 percent 
regarded increased scarcity of food and water as “very probable” or 
“somewhat probable.” This risk area consequently ranks in the upper middle 
of risks most often cited as (highly or somewhat) likely to occur. The personal 
impact of this eventuality for people in Germany is however seen as relatively 
low. A total of 42 percent of respondents thought it would have a “very high” 
or “somewhat high” impact on their personal lives. Increased food and water 
scarcity is thus one of the dangers where the discrepancy between perceived 
probability of occurrence and assessment of personal impact is the highest. 
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Energy and resource scarcity 
 
Facts and figures 
With the world’s population increasing and global economic output 
constantly expanding, the demand for energy and natural resources is growing 
stronger worldwide. Efforts to reduce consumption of resources, and energy 
in particular, have only been partially successful until now (SERI 2010). The 
global economy grew by around 164 percent between 1979 and 2008, adjusted 
for changes in purchasing power (IMF 2011b). Worldwide energy 
requirements may have grown at a slower rate, with an increase of 70 percent 
(IEA 2010a), however this increase was still much too high, especially given 
the challenges of climate change.  
The energy requirements of large emerging powers such as China, India and 
Indonesia are expected to greatly increase in the coming decades: The 
“Current Policies” scenario produced by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) assumes that the entire primary energy demand of non-OECD 
countries will almost double from 6,516 Mtoe (megatons of oil equivalents) in 
2008 to 11,696 Mtoe in 2035 (IEA 2010b). 
Demand for coal, in particular, will rise sharply if current political conditions 
remain largely unchanged: In the same scenario, the IEA predicts worldwide 
demand for coal to rise from an annual 3,315 Mtoe in 2008 to 4,307 (5,281 
Mtoe) in 2020 (2035), with non-OECD countries accounting for the entire 
increase (IEA 2010b). China’s “coal hunger,” especially, is immense, with the 
IEA predicting it will represent over half of excess consumption. 
Consequently the price for thermal coal has been rising for some time and 
since the early 1990s has almost tripled in real terms (IMF 2011b). The strong 
growth of emerging markets also contributes to the shortage and thus rising 
costs of other energy sources. The Energy Price Index (coal, gas, crude oil) has 
risen by 300 to 400 percent since 1990 (IMF 2011b). 
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Renewable energies and nuclear power represent possible solutions to the 
raw material dilemma, however since the Fukushima catastrophe nuclear 
power is more contentious than ever, and the development of renewable 
energies lags behind rapidly increasing energy demands. 
Global raw material reserves – both energy and non-energy sources – are 
nonetheless limited. If green electricity generation can establish itself on a 
sufficient scale, this would mean a sharp increase in demand for certain raw 
materials such as rare earths. Demand is expected to increase from 130,000 
tonnes (2009) to 210,000 tonnes (2015) worldwide (Bloomberg 2010). The 
likely growth of the “bottom of the pyramid,” that is, the largest and poorest 
sector of the world’s population, as well as the steady growth of the global 
middle class would also massively increase worldwide resource demands if 
they follow conventional growth paradigms. 
Reserves of raw materials required for industrial production are finite and 
limited to a few countries, which in turn has negative consequences for 
security of supply. Costs for raw materials have increased sharply since the 
start of the millennium with the price index for primary industrial products 
(agricultural products and metals) rising from 78.39 points in January 2000 to 
208.36 points in July 2011 (IMF 2011c). In the future raw material costs may 
increase further, and with greater volatility, increasing the risk of geopolitical 
resource conflicts. 
On the one hand raw materials are in short supply, on the other hand 
environmental damage and other effects of resource exploitation can’t be 
underestimated, although this will presumably be more readily tolerated in the 
light of rising raw material prices. However, the threat of climate change also 
brings opportunities, if for example developing countries are able to move 
beyond the West’s energy-intensive economic model. 
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Key statements on “energy and resource scarcity” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
The experts’ opinions confirm the major significance that natural resources 
have for the global economy, as outlined in the introduction. They regard 
energy and resource scarcity as a risk area with high potential impact for the 
global economy, giving it an average of 5.36 on a scale of 1 (very low) to 6 
(very high) – only the collapse of finance markets (5.68) scored higher. The 
respondents also feel there is a pressing need to act – they see the quest for 
effective measures in dealing with energy and raw material scarcity as the 
highest priority among all the risk areas (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1: Recommended priorities in averting/mitigating risks (all respondents)  
 
The experts assume that the major significance of energy and raw material 
scarcity will be recognized at the decision-making level. They regard concerns 
related to risks and challenges as very high, giving an average rating of 4.76 
(where 1 stands for the lowest level of concern). Only international terrorism 
and the potential collapse of finance markets are assumed to be of greater 
concern to decision makers. 
The experts give a wide variety of answers to the open question of the 
gravest economic consequences of energy and raw material scarcity, at times 
incorporating consequences not strictly economic in nature.  
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Many experts believe the global economy would be directly affected in the 
form of rising costs and falling productivity. One German economist sees 
value creation transferring at least in part from the service sector back to 
industrial production. Higher macroeconomic costs may have to be factored 
into goods production, with correspondingly fewer resources available to the 
service sector.  
Respondents see the widening worldwide gap between rich and poor as a 
danger for economic performance. They expect new political dependencies 
and more unstable political conditions overall, giving rise to protectionist 
tendencies as well as international resource conflicts, increasing social 
inequality (both within and between countries) and military conflicts over raw 
materials. Experts see the poorest of the poor as the main losers, and the 
danger of uprisings as a likely outcome.  
The risk to the environment is often cited along with social consequences. 
Some respondents speculate that exploitation of resources will be 
accompanied by ever greater risks in the future, with an increase in 
environmental pollution as a consequence. One expert describes the 
possibility that nuclear energy might play a larger role in future electricity 
generation as a negative outcome.  
Some of the experts interviewed also see opportunities in the resulting 
pressure to adapt. More research and development in the field of alternative 
energies and energy efficiency as well as breakthroughs in the field of material 
efficiency could have positive consequences of energy and raw material 
scarcity. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
Those interviewed regard concern among decision makers regarding energy 
and resource scarcity as very high. They evaluate comprehension of the causes, 
effects and consequences as relatively high, with an average rating of 4.40 on a 
scale from 1 to 6 (Fig. 2). This makes energy and resource scarcity the risk area 
with the greatest comprehension (along with aging societies) according to the 
experts, but even here they see information deficits. 
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Fig. 2: Comprehension of the risk areas on the part of global decision-making elites (all 
respondents) 
 
The respondents regard the quality of present solution strategies for energy 
and resource scarcity more positively than in other risk areas while at the same 
time seeing significant room for improvement: They evaluate efforts at solving 
this problem with an average rating of 3.43 on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 
(very good). 
The primary cause of this modest rating presumably lies in comprehension 
and knowledge deficits. In contrast to most other risk areas there is no 
correlation in responses to the two questions: Respondents who regard the 
quality of risk management negatively rarely believe comprehension to be low 
as well. It can be further assumed that the experts blame mediocre solution 
strategies on technological shortfall on the one hand and a lack of political 
consensus on the other. Consensus on effective risk-mitigation measures is 
indeed very low – a cause for concern in light of its relevance not just for the 
global economy, but for the global climate as well.  
Of the experts interviewed, 57 percent see a lack of political consensus as 
the main obstacle to a solution, while 30 percent put the lack of appropriate 
technologies at the top – more than with any other risk area. This result 
corresponds with the at times bitter debate about expansion of renewable 
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energies, which the lack of political consensus vividly demonstrates. The issue 
of price, often cited as an argument against renewable energies, results from a 
lack of reasonably-priced technologies suitable for mass market usage.  
Nonetheless the respondents regard the probability of a future solution 
about as highly as, for example, the prospects for solving the threat of 
financial market collapse or excessive state debt – on a scale of 1 (very low) to 
6 (very high), the average probability rating is 3.67. 
A glimpse at the data shows that those experts who cite a lack of 
appropriate technologies as the main obstacle are particularly optimistic – they 
evidently assume that the required technology will become (cheaply) available 
sooner or later, and that it will also be implemented. On the other hand, 
participants who see a lack of political consensus as the greatest obstacle are 
highly pessimistic about the possibility of a future solution to the issue.  
Responses to the open question of best approaches demonstrate wide-
spread agreement among the experts. Well over half of their responses relate 
to the area of renewable energies and energy efficiency: Recommendations 
range from the search for alternative energy sources and greater promotion of 
renewable energies to the abolition of false incentives, such as the hidden 
subsidization of energy consumption in the transport and agricultural sectors. 
One expert proposes an internationally coordinated energy and raw material 
distribution mechanism which would no longer disadvantage poorer states. 
There were isolated calls for additional investment in coal and gas, particularly 
in Africa, as well as securing free trade in energy sources.  
A further oft-cited approach emphasizes the importance of general scarcity 
consciousness. This approach aims at raising awareness among the general 
population, as well as politicians, of the finite nature of the resources they use 
every day, so that a more frugal approach becomes second nature sooner or 
later. To this end politicians, and ideally companies as well, would intensively 
promote sustainable lifestyles. The respondents see the G20 countries as 
particularly responsible here.  
Overall, a global consensus on common interests and living standards is re-
quired for the significance of the finitude of natural resources to anchor in the 
consciousness of decision makers and the general population. 
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Public opinion in Germany 
The growing scarcity of energy and raw materials is – together with the 
danger of the gap between the world’s rich and poor increasing – the risk that 
according to most members of the public canvassed by infas will actually 
occur: 92 percent believe that it is “very probable” or “somewhat probable” to 
occur. It is also an eventuality that most members of the German public 
believe will have an impact on their own lives: 76 percent believe that growing 
scarcity of energy and raw materials will have a “very high” or “somewhat 
high” impact on their lives. This puts it at the top of the eleven risk areas for 
both the probability of its occurrence as well as its personal impact. 
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Socioeconomic inequality 
 
Facts and figures 
Extreme socioeconomic inequality has an immense capacity to tear societies 
apart, for various reasons. In particularly unequal societies, long-term 
unemployment, poverty and complete dependence on state welfare payments 
(if available) exclude many people at the bottom of the social structure from 
taking part in society, while the upper classes live in a comparatively luxurious 
parallel world. Above all, it is in the large urban centers of emerging countries 
that socioeconomic contrasts collide. 
In Brazil, for example, the most common measure for social inequality, the 
Gini coefficient (ranging from 0 to 1) is a relatively high 0.55,1 despite a slight 
drop in recent years. In China, inequality has increased significantly since the 
mid 1980s and the Gini coefficient has risen from 0.3 to 0.4 (The Economist 
2011). Various Latin American and African countries are beset by inequality 
(CIA 2011a). 
However, socioeconomic inequality is increasingly also becoming an issue in 
developed economies. In the United States, the share of national income 
earned by those in the top income brackets has grown rapidly since the early 
1980s, as shown in a study by Berkeley professor Emmanuel Saez. According 
to his research, the proportion of total income earned by the top ten percent 
 
1 The Gini coefficient measures the deviation between actual distribution and equal 
distribution, which in the economic context generally refers to wealth or income. Equal 
distribution, in which all citizens have exactly the same wealth or income, would have a 
Gini coefficient of 0; Gini coefficient 1 would be reached if one person owned all the 
wealth and other citizens had none. 
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rose from about 33 percent in 1977 to almost 50 percent in 2007, with the top 
one percent recording a massive gain from ten percent to about 22 percent 
(Saez 2010). According to the CIA, the Gini coefficient has recently risen from 
0.41 in 1997 to 0.45 in 2009 (CIA 2011b). 
The potential consequences of social and economic inequality are diverse 
and complex. Strong socioeconomic inequality can lead to differences in 
health between social classes, for example – health then becomes a clear 
indicator of wealth (Siegrist, Marmot 2008). Additionally, children from poor 
backgrounds often have markedly less access to education and, later, to the job 
market. 
Socioeconomic inequality therefore has a self-reinforcing effect – it prevents 
or limits social mobility, which in turn further entrenches social divisions. 
An unequal society is more susceptible to violent conflict, political 
extremism and criminality. This is shown in two examples from Europe: the 
civil unrest in the suburbs of French cities in 2005 or the violent clashes in 
London in the summer of 2011. When large sections of the population lack 
access to education, the economy suffers from a lack of qualified workers – an 
unsustainable situation, especially given the impending global shortage of 
skilled workers (Deloitte 2010). Overall, a society that suffers from wide social 
and economic gaps has to make great efforts to alleviate the consequences of 
this division. 
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Key statements on “socioeconomic inequality” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
Growing socioeconomic equality is not at root an economic phenomenon, 
but the experts assign a strong economic relevance to the risk area. They give 
the potential impact on the global economy a score of 4.57 on a scale of 1 
(very low) to 6 (very high), which is roughly equivalent to the potential impact 
of food and water scarcity and aging societies, but significantly lower than the 
impact of a financial market collapse, for example (5.68). 
Nonetheless, once again it is clear that the respondents are not only 
concerned with the potential economic impact: finding a solution to growing 
socioeconomic inequality in societies should, according to the experts, be 
almost as high on the global agenda as avoiding a financial market collapse and 
dealing with energy and resource scarcity. The respondents therefore attach 
the greatest urgency to the problem of socioeconomic inequality. Participants 
from non-OECD states, in particular, prioritize a solution to this set of 
problems and consider their own region to be worse affected than the global 
average (Fig. 1).  
Fig. 1:  Impact of socioeconomic inequality on the respondent’s country of origin 
compared to impact on the global economy: percentage distribution of 
respondents’ assessments 
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In response to the open question of what the most serious economic effects 
of growing socioeconomic inequality would be, the experts mainly draw 
attention to the grave consequences of inequality in the social arena.  
The respondents emphasize the fact that socioeconomic imbalances push 
large sections of the working age population to the edges of society, robbing 
these people of prospects. This leads to frustration and entrenches social 
divisions. Seen from an economic perspective, a lack of options for large 
segments of the society also represents a considerable waste of human capital. 
Inner cohesion weakens in the affected societies, the rich increasingly wall 
themselves off and the likelihood of social unrest, revolution and even wars 
and terrorism increases, according to some experts.  
Respondents often raise the argument that extreme inequality is a burden on 
national finances – either because of high redistribution costs or due to the 
high costs of public security.  
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
As with the case of food and water scarcity, despite the severe potential 
impact outlined by the experts, they perceive only limited concern for the 
problem on the part of decision makers, when compared to other risk areas. 
The respondents rated the level of concern with an average of 4.0 on a scale of 
1 (very low) to 6 (very high). In the eyes of respondents, the decision makers’ 
agenda is dominated, instead, by the issues of international terrorism (4.97), 
upheavals in financial markets (4.82) and energy and resource scarcity (4.76). 
Comprehension of this risk area among academics and decision makers is 
also apparently average, at best. Nevertheless, this is not particularly 
meaningful because the experts rate most risk areas at the same mediocre 
level. 
Whereas the imputed average comprehension of the risk area is therefore 
not a particular cause for concern, the experts’ pessimism regarding current 
efforts to solve the problem of inequality should be heeded. On average, the 
respondents rate the quality of endeavors to find a solution with a score of 
2.90 on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good), that is, poor overall. 
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Even more alarming, however, is the pessimism displayed by experts when it 
comes to a consensus on appropriate risk-mitigation measures: on average, 
they evaluate the level of current consensus with a score of just 2.47 on a scale 
of 1 to 6. Some experts believe that there is not even a rudimentary consensus, 
assigning the lowest available score of 1. In line with this, the respondents 
consider the probability of finding a future solution to be slight, with an aver-
age rating of 3.04 (Fig. 2). 
Fig. 2: Probability of averting/mitigating risks in the future (all respondents) 
 
For the risk area “socioeconomic inequalities,” as with the “food and water 
scarcity” risk area, there is a clear discrepancy between the experts’ perception 
of the problem on the one hand and the level of concern they impute to 
decision makers on the other. Although respondents classify the issue as 
highly relevant in both the social and economic contexts and believe a solution 
urgently needs to be found, they see only a low level of concern among 
decision makers and consider the proposed measures to be in need of 
considerable improvement. 
When asked about the best approach, most experts mention redistribution 
measures (to counteract the present distribution of wealth). They propose 
fairer tax systems and stress the importance of a sense of social solidarity. All 
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the proposals are aimed at increasing levies on higher incomes and capital 
income. Negative income tax, higher taxation of top income, inheritance or 
property taxes and taxing financial transactions are all mentioned. In addition 
to fiscal redistribution instruments, the experts also consider education and 
health policy to be a suitable arena for reducing social inequality. 
An expert from Pakistan explicitly calls for effective legal equality of poor 
and wealthy citizens. In terms of developing and emerging countries, the 
suggestions point towards Amartya Sen’s capability approach, which includes 
factors such as political freedom, education, health and social security among 
the instrumental functions of freedom (Kuklys 2005). 
Purely economic solutions are also mentioned: many experts call for 
stronger competition in order to prevent the formation of monopolies, free 
market access for goods or unrestricted labor mobility. A business 
representative from South America believes that promoting entrepreneurship 
would be an effective measure. Some experts also propose spreading 
democracy as a solution to the problem of inequality.  
However, the most fundamental proposals are aimed squarely at politicians 
and other decision makers: in the eyes of many experts, there is not only a 
need for a stronger awareness of inequality, more importantly there needs to 
be an express political will to tackle the problem – and to put the well-being of 
the whole society before the well-being of the “top ten thousand.” 
Public opinion in Germany 
More than 90 percent of German citizens believe that the gap between rich 
and poor will grow, worldwide. Together with the risk of increasing energy 
and resource scarcity, the growth in global income disparities is the risk that 
the greatest number of those surveyed by infas believe likely to occur. 
Nevertheless, only 43 percent believe that this development will have any 
impact on their own life. A global widening of the gap between rich and poor 
is therefore the risk with the greatest discrepancy between how likely the 
German public believes the danger to be and how much those same people 
believe this issue will affect them personally. 
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Uncontrolled mass migration 
 
Facts and figures 
The famine in the Horn of Africa in the summer of 2011 showed 
dramatically how drought-related water and food crises can deprive an entire 
region of the foundations of life. It also provided a hint of the explosive force 
contained in the forced migration of millions of people. According to U.N. 
estimates, 12 million people in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya were 
sufficiently undernourished to be considered starving or at risk of starving 
(UN 2012). The economically underdeveloped Kenya was overwhelmed by 
the situation. By August 2011, the country’s Dadaab refugee camp was 
hopelessly overcrowded with around 400,000 refugees, with at least 116,000 
people having arrived between January and August 2011 alone (GfbV 2011).  
Conflicts and wars, a prostrate economy, the effects of climate change or – 
as in the Horn of Africa – a combination of these factors is rendering some 
regions of the world increasingly uninhabitable. Directly or indirectly, they 
deprive local residents of the foundations of economic life, or even present a 
mortal danger. If possible, therefore, those individuals affected leave their 
homes in the hope of finding a better life elsewhere. Between 2000 and 2010, 
the number of worldwide migrants consequently rose from 150 million to 214 
million (UN 2008). At a total of 15 million, the share of climate-related 
refugees remains relatively low today, but according to Stern Review, this 
figure may climb as high as 200 million by the year 2050 (Stern 2006).  
Mass migration can in addition exacerbate social and economic problems 
both in refugees' countries of origin and in those where they seek to build a 
new life – particularly in developing countries such as Kenya. Although 
economically more powerful countries also fear an influx of refugees – as for 
instance Italy, which early in 2011 requested European Union help in handling 
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15,000 Tunisian refugees – but in general refugee issues play a much larger 
role in developing countries.  
Italy’s claim was perhaps exaggerated, but it does show that large, 
uncontrolled refugee flows can create serious short-term problems in 
destination countries. If future climatic conditions worsen, particularly in arid 
areas, living conditions would be further undermined, and the frequency and 
extent of famines such as that in the Horn of Africa could also increase. Even 
countries that to date have been little or not all affected could see themselves 
confronted with refugee flows.  
For the world community, this presents an immense challenge. From a 
moral perspective, events of this scale demand action such as disaster relief. 
But precarious living conditions also serve as a breeding ground for extremist 
ideas, both in refugees’ countries of origin and in destination countries. 
Uncontrolled mass migration therefore has both moral and security-policy 
implications. 
Large-scale migration – if it takes place over a longer period of time rather 
than abruptly – can also be an advantage for the destination countries, and can 
contribute to a shift in global power relations. Historical examples include the 
waves of emigration from Europe to the United States, particularly between 
the 17th century and the end of World War II. 
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Key statements on “uncontrolled mass migration” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
Experts rate the potential for damage to the world economy associated with 
uncontrolled mass migration as significantly lower than is the case for most 
other risk areas. However, given an average rating of 4.16 on a scale of 1 (very 
low) to 6 (very high), this does not mean they see mass migration as 
economically unproblematic. 
The experts considered uncontrolled mass migration to be comparatively 
less urgent than other risk areas – indeed, they accorded a lower priority only 
to the solution of problems associated with aging societies. In their answers to 
the open question on the most serious economic consequences of 
uncontrolled mass migration, the experts’ concerns related both to migrants’ 
potential destination countries and countries of origin.  
In the destination countries, respondents warned of rising social inequality 
and social unrest generated by the lack of integration of a large number of 
immigrants. As specific problems in this context, they identified a rise in 
unemployment, high levels of pressure on social systems, the formation of 
ghettos and a rise in crime.  
Consequences in migrants’ countries of origin are naturally somewhat 
different. Experts see a particular danger of brain drain, or a mass exodus of 
well-educated people abroad; initially, this further exacerbates conditions 
within the country of origin, but in extreme cases can destabilize an entire 
region, foster the emergence of failed states, exacerbate inequalities between 
countries and lead to further deterioration in security conditions.  
Several experts pointed to a lack of “refugee management” in destination 
countries as bearing a share of responsibility for the problems. An expert from 
Africa explicitly places opportunities for migrants in the foreground of 
analysis, particularly if these have been the subject of anticipation. In this view, 
migration is simply a form of labor mobility. This interpretation emphasizes 
long-term effects and opportunities related to migration, and it is probable 
that the expert conceives migration to be a continuous rather than a disruptive 
phenomenon. 
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Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures  
In the view of the survey respondents, uncontrolled mass migration 
provokes only moderate levels of concern among decision makers. On a scale 
of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), the experts rated the level of concern at an 
average value of 3.89. Decision makers were more concerned about most 
other risk areas, in the eyes of the survey respondents.  
Uncontrolled mass migration is perceived to be the most poorly understood 
risk area (Fig. 1). One reason could be that this risk area, as noted briefly 
above, is strongly driven by other phenomena, and is thus primarily a 
consequence of other high-risk developments at the global level.  
Fig. 1: Comprehension of risk areas on the part of global decision-making elites (all 
respondents) 
 
Solutions proposed by the experts suggested that social inequality, war, 
climate change, but also factors such as protectionism could in the final 
analysis lead to mass migration; this risk area is thus characterized by a 
complex weave of cause-and-effect relationships. For this reason, experts 
assess comprehension of the area to be as low as for the outbreak of global 
pandemics or the failure of technological infrastructures.  
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Survey respondents correspondingly assessed current efforts to manage 
mass migration as poor – on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good), they 
gave solution strategies an average rating of 2.5. This may be a result of the 
minimum level of consensus ascribed to decision makers, which experts saw 
as lower here than in any other risk area (Fig. 2). The average rating of 2.16 
indicates that consensus levels are very low indeed (1 represents no consensus, 
while 6 indicates a maximum level). 
Fig. 2:  Global decision-making elite consensus on appropriate risk area mitigation 
measures (all respondents) 
 
Fittingly, the experts assess the probability of averting or mitigating this risk 
as the lowest among all risk areas. The reason for this result is probably that 
uncontrolled mass migration is perceived to be an issue embedded in a 
complex interdependent array of numerous other factors, and is 
correspondingly difficult to address.  
The experts’ responses to the open question as to the potentially most 
effective risk-mitigation measures fell into two main categories: addressing the 
root causes in migrants’ countries of origin on the one hand, and “managing” 
migrant flows in destination countries on the other. The former has been the 
object of development policy for many years, with moderate success – 
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however, the question of its effectiveness is quite controversial. This may help 
explain the experts’ fatalism. Solution proposals ranged from comprehensive 
knowledge transfer to the alleviation of damage caused by climate change to 
more economically oriented approaches such as the promotion of foreign 
direct investment and ensuring ample credit supply for small borrowers – 
experts thus focused largely on the sustainable support of economies in 
migrant origin countries. In this context, some respondents also mentioned 
the establishment of democracy and free market economies in migrant origin 
countries.  
In the second category, measures deemed potentially effective focused on 
the contrary on strategies enabling destination countries to adapt to migration. 
In addition to a clear, internationally valid, and above all transparent set of 
rules, the survey respondents called for better handling of migrants in 
destination countries, through means such as providing education for migrants 
in training centers, or seeking to reduce antagonisms through appropriate 
campaigns. 
Public opinion in Germany 
The majority of Germans expect a strong increase in global refugee flows. 
Three-quarters of citizens canvassed by the infas opinion researchers said that 
major global migratory movements due to war, poverty and climate change 
were “somewhat probable” or “very probable.” In terms of probability of 
occurrence, this placed the refugee issue in the middle of the 11 risk areas. By 
contrast, Germans assessed the potential impact on their personal lives as 
being comparatively minimal. Thirty-nine percent of poll respondents 
expected that the emergence of large refugee flows would have a “very high” 
or “somewhat high” impact on their personal lives. Only the outbreak of trade 
wars had a lower assessed value (just 35% said a trade war would have very 
large or somewhat large effects on their personal life). 
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International terrorism 
Facts and figures 
With religious fundamentalism on the rise and increasing ethnic extremism, 
terrorism has become a serious threat to public security and political stability 
in many regions of the world. Since the early 1990s, the number of deaths per 
year caused by fatal terrorist bombings has risen dramatically, from an average 
high of 500 to about 3000 today (CSP 2011). Whereas in 2005, a total of about 
6,300 people died as a result of terrorism (excluding deaths in Iraq), the 
statistic for 2009 was over 11,300 (NCTC 2010). 
Nevertheless, the number of victims killed by international terrorists is 
significantly lower: between 1990 and 2000, an average of 269 people died 
annually, while between 2002 and 2009, the figure was 522 (the 2001 attacks in 
the United States, which claimed about 3000 victims, are not included in this 
count). 
From an economic perspective, it is above all the psychological effects of 
international terrorism that pose a hazard. The attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 show that a single act of 
terrorism is enough to trigger protracted wars and fundamentally alter global 
alliances and geopolitical objectives. The causes of terrorism are various and 
complex. Poverty and low levels of education on the part of the terrorists have 
a significant role to play. However, political circumstances play a more crucial 
role, such as oppression of the population by authoritarian regimes, long-
standing feelings of frustration and humiliation, as well as the concomitant 
lack of prospects, as shown in a study of the causes of terrorism (Krueger, 
Maleckova 2002).  
Purely economic consequences of terrorism include the rising costs of 
public security and defending against terrorist attacks. A climate of fear has a 
negative impact on a society’s vitality and economic power – not to mention 
immediate losses in quality of life. Large-scale terrorist attacks can lead to 
diplomatic tension, military interventions or even wars. 
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Key statements on “international terrorism” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
The experts consider international terrorism to have the lowest potential 
economic impact of all the risk areas (Fig. 1). On a scale of 1 (very low) to 6 
(very high), they give it an average score of 3.97. 
Fig. 1: Potential impact of risk areas on global economy (all respondents) 
 
 
According to the respondents, finding a solution to the problem of 
international terrorism should be assigned middling priority (place 6 out of 
11). Respondents from the world of business assign a significantly higher 
priority to this risk area than academics do. The obvious conclusion here is 
that the psychological effects of terrorist attacks appear serious to 
representatives from industry and commerce and therefore damaging to 
business, whereas scholars are perhaps affected less and therefore see less 
reason for concern. 
In answer to the open question of what the most serious economic 
consequences of international terrorism would be, the experts mention a range 
of factors. They foresee the risk of growing instability and increasing political 
extremism, resulting in a restriction of democracy and civil rights in favor of 
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public security. Terrorist attacks could weaken the social cohesiveness of 
societies and undermine the foundations of economic interaction. 
Two experts point to the danger of military disputes between states in 
regions such as the Middle East – a scenario that is more than possible, given 
the Iraq War. In general, by exacerbating religious and cultural 
misunderstandings, international terrorism aggravates the risk of diplomatic 
conflicts and military conflicts. 
In the experts’ view, rising expenditure on public security is to be expected, 
thereby limiting financial latitude for other portfolios. Furthermore, there is a 
risk of overspending by states when combating terrorism. 
In addition to the above direct reactions to states affected, or apparently 
affected, by terrorism, the respondents also expect international terrorism to 
have serious psychological consequences, such as increasing uncertainty and a 
general loss of confidence. Both could lead to lower trade volumes and 
diminished interaction, eventually resulting in a drop in national income 
worldwide. Other economic consequences named by the experts include 
decreased tourism in countries targeted by terrorists and the loss of foreign 
direct investment. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
On average, the experts consider the potential impact on the global 
economy to be weak and therefore they assign a comparatively low priority to 
fighting terrorism. This is in stark contrast to the high level of concern that the 
experts see the subject evoking in decision makers around the world (Fig 2). 
According to the respondents, international terrorism places a greater burden 
on decision makers than even a possible collapse of financial markets or 
excessive sovereign debt. 
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Fig. 2: Level of concern about the risk areas on the part of global decision-making 
elites (all respondents) 
 
The respondents here are presumably reflecting the levels of alarm felt by 
politicians, who are forced to act or at least make the right noises due to the 
overbearing presence of terrorism in the media and the associated perceived 
danger to the life and limb of citizens. 
When it comes to the question of how well the causes, mechanisms and 
effects of international terrorism are understood, the experts are skeptical. 
They rate the knowledge of decision makers and academics with an average 
score of 3.82 on a scale of 1 to 6, the latter representing a very high level of 
knowledge. As such, the respondents believe that comprehension of 
international terrorism is unexceptional and at about the same level as 
comprehension of food and water scarcity. 
This would suggest that the respondents are not guided by the strong media 
presence of certain risk areas when assessing the expertise and knowledge 
available – for example, although the risks of a financial market collapse are 
currently a subject of intensive debate in the press, the experts do not consider 
the issue to be particularly well understood. 
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In the eyes of respondents, current efforts to solve the problem of 
international terrorism score top out of all the risk areas, despite the mediocre 
comprehension of the problem (Fig. 3). They give current solution strategies a 
score of 3.91 on scale of 1 to 6 (where 6 is “very good”). 
Fig. 3: Quality of risk management (all respondents) 
 
 
One obvious explanation is that the experts primarily link comprehension of 
the risk area to an understanding of its causes, whereas they mainly understand 
a good approach to be one that prevents attacks. According to this 
interpretation, weak comprehension and good solution strategies represent 
consistent replies for the issue of international terrorism.  
With an average score of 3.50 on a scale of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), the 
experts see only limited consensus on appropriate risk-mitigation measures, 
but this is nevertheless the greatest consensus among decision makers that the 
respondents attribute to any of the risk areas (Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4:  Global decision-making elite consensus on appropriate risk area mitigation 
measures (all respondents)  
 
However, they see the probability of finding a future solution to be about as 
modest as it is with almost all the other risk areas – even a high level of 
concern among decision makers and a comparatively far-reaching consensus 
on risk-mitigation measures are not enough to inspire optimism in the 
majority of respondents. 
Replies to the question of the most effective risk-mitigation measures to 
counteract international terrorism can be divided into two categories: in 
addition to solutions geared toward preventing serious attacks, the experts also 
propose measures intended to deprive terrorism of its foundations. For 
example, the replies include calls for greater public security. Experts also place 
emphasis on international cooperation between intelligence services, as well as 
controls on the arms and drug trades. 
Respondents believe terrorism to be rooted, above all, in the terrorists’ 
world view and in their values. For this reason, greater research is needed into 
the causes and determinants of terrorism, according to the experts. Many 
participants consider that it is the duty of politicians to promote tolerance 
around the world and advocate free and humane education free from 
restrictions on the grounds of politics, race or religion. Additionally, the 
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enormous economic inequalities between and within states need to be 
reduced. Combating poverty is also an important element in containing 
terrorism. Last but not least, the experts mention regional conflicts such as 
those in Kashmir, Palestine or Korea, which, if pacified, could remove at least 
some of the basis for terrorism. 
Public opinion in Germany 
Seventy-two percent of German citizens consider an increase in 
international terrorism and a rise in the number of devastating terror attacks to 
be “very probable” or “somewhat probable.” This places the risk near the 
middle of the probability ranking for the eleven risks. In terms of personal 
impact, by contrast, the risk of increasing international terrorism figures less 
strongly: 42 percent of those surveyed by infas believe that this trend will have 
“very high” or “somewhat high” consequences for themselves. In the ranking 
of personal impact, this risk is placed third to last, together with the risk of 
increasing food and water scarcity. Only when it comes to the danger of 
international flows of refugees and the outbreak of trade wars does a smaller 
proportion of the German public fear a major impact on their life, at 39 and 
35 percent, respectively. 
 
Aging Societies 75 
 
Aging societies 
 
Facts and figures 
In most countries, life expectancy at birth has risen dramatically in recent 
decades (ZDWA 2005). Worldwide, it rose from just under 48 years for those 
born between 1950 and 1955, to 69 for people born today. This trend is 
expected to continue, resulting in an average life expectancy of about 76 years 
by 2050 (UN 2010). Increasing wealth, advances in medicine and hygiene and 
changing lifestyles all play a part in this. 
This development has different consequences in different regions. In less 
developed countries, this increased longevity is combined with a high birth 
rate and only a slow growth in the percentage of elderly people, with the end 
result that a longer life expectancy has also increased the general population’s 
earning capacity. 
In developed areas of the world, particularly Europe and Japan, a somewhat 
different picture emerges. While life expectancies continue to rise, fertility 
rates are low. In Europe, for example, a woman has an average of 1.59 
children, whereas in Japan the figure is only 1.42. Consequently, the median 
age in Europe has risen from about 32 years in 1970 (Japan: 29) to around 40 
today (Japan: almost 45). The proportion of over 65s is already 15.9 percent 
today (22.7% in Japan) and, according to the United Nations, is set to increase 
to 22.4 percent (30.3%) by 2030 (UN 2010). As a result, society is aging 
rapidly in countries with low birth rates. 
While the population of India continues to soar (the United Nations fore-
casts India’s population to be as large as China’s by 2020, at 1.387 billion), 
China will also have to face up to the effects of an aging demographic in the 
long term. The fertility rate in China has also fallen to a little over 1.5 children 
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per woman, while life expectancy has risen from about 29 years in the 1950s 
to 73.8 today (UN 2010). 
In the affected national economies, a shrinking working age population is 
faced with an ever growing number of elderly people whose health and liveli-
hood have to be provided for. As a result, there is increasing pressure on 
social security systems. A failure to integrate older people into the world of 
work could impair a national economy’s ability to innovate. Furthermore, 
intergenerational conflicts within societies could intensify if an ever decreasing 
number of young people are expected to provide for an ever growing number 
of the elderly. 
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Key statements on “aging societies” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
The experts give the economic impact of aging societies a score of 4.45 on a 
scale of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high). Although this is quite high in absolute 
terms, compared to most of the other risk areas, the experts see the potential 
global impact as less noteworthy. For example, the respondents consider the 
risks of excessive sovereign debt or energy and resource scarcity to be of far 
greater economic significance than aging societies. Participants from OECD 
states assign slightly greater importance to the economic impact of aging 
societies than experts from non-OECD countries – above all, however, they 
consider their respective country of origin to be disproportionately affected in 
comparison to the rest of the world (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1:  Impact of aging societies on the respondent’s country of origin compared to 
impact on the global economy: percentage distribution of respondents’ 
  assessments 
 
 
Moreover, the experts do not consider aging societies and their diminishing 
productivity to be a problem that urgently requires a solution, ranking it last 
(Fig. 2). This evaluation can be explained by the characteristics of the process 
by which societies age: Societies do not age overnight – it is a slow, steady and 
foreseeable process and, as such, national economies can adapt gradually.  
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Fig. 2: Recommended priorities in averting/mitigating risks (all respondents) 
 
Most experts regard the most serious economic consequence of aging 
societies to be the increasing pressure on welfare systems, which are in need of 
long-term reform. They fear a further burdening of public finances that will 
either drive states further into debt or lead to successive cutbacks in state 
support for the elderly, who would drift into poverty. Some experts foresee 
the danger of a complete collapse of the pension schemes. 
Other immediate economic consequences of aging societies frequently 
identified by respondents include a shortage of qualified workers and 
shrinking growth rates or the diminishing vitality of economies, the risk of 
increasing social and intergenerational inequalities and resultant social 
tensions. A strong growth in national savings is also mentioned as a 
consequence of aging populations. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
The experts consider the risks relating to aging societies to be better 
understood than any other risk area (apart from energy and resource scarcity, 
with which it shares top spot, see Fig. 3), awarding an average score of 4.40 to 
comprehension of the problem on a scale of 1 to 6. The respondents assume 
that although concern for the problem is quite high among decision makers, it 
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is only moderate compared to the other risk areas. On average, they assign a 
score of 4.36 on a scale of 1 to 6 (with 1 representing the lowest level of 
concern). On the one hand, it is evident that aging populations are a serious 
challenge for the societies in question, on the other, however, the problem is 
one that will emerge slowly and is therefore not a major cause for concern. 
Fig. 3:  Comprehension of risk areas on the part of global decision-making elites (all 
respondents)) 
 
As such, aging societies and their consequences are considered to be a well 
understood problem. Solutions will only be needed a few years or decades 
from now, so decision makers are significantly less concerned with this area 
than they are with international terrorism or financial market crises, for 
example. 
The experts are unanimous in thinking that current measures to counter the 
problems of aging societies are in need of significant improvement, even if the 
measures are not exceptionally poor – the respondents give them an average 
score of 3.33 on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good). When it comes to 
global consensus on how to handle the risk area, the experts also take a rather 
poor view, with a score of 3.37 on a scale of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), 
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although this is a markedly more positive evaluation than that of almost any 
other risk area.  
Nevertheless, in the eyes of the experts, a consensus on how best to address 
the problem has no bearing on the probability that solutions will be found in 
the future for the problems associated with the risk of aging societies. Unlike 
the other risk areas, there is no correlation here between the experts’ 
responses – those who take a positive view of the consensus on risk-
mitigation measures do not necessarily have a correspondingly positive view of 
the probability of a future solution. 
The fact that, unlike elsewhere, there is no correlation here is probably due 
to the nature of the issue of aging societies and its megatrend status: the 
development is recognized, entrenched and manifests itself over long periods 
of time – accordingly, the current state of discourse is immaterial to the 
probability of a future solution. 
This interpretation is also consistent with responses given to the question of 
identifying the key barrier to a solution. Whereas in most of the other risk 
areas, the respondents point to the lack of political consensus as the principal 
obstacle, in the case of aging societies, fewer than half (45% of the responses) 
select this option. The remaining experts consider a lack of aware-ness (21%) 
or a dearth of suitable technologies (16%) as the key barriers to developing a 
solution. 
When asked about the most effective measures to counter the effects of 
aging societies, most of the experts responded with variations and 
combinations of two approaches: adaptation and migration. The manifold 
proposals for adaptation strategies include raising the retirement age, better 
integration of the elderly into working life, making it easier to combine a 
career and children and greater investment in education. There are also 
demands to overhaul the pensions systems in favor of funded pension 
insurance schemes in order to avoid the risk of increasing sovereign debt. 
In addition to merely adapting to an aging society, some experts also pro-
pose an active migration policy. After all, many developed countries suffer 
from a shortage of young people, while other countries are unable to offer 
satisfactory opportunities to large swathes of their younger population. 
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Measures that are frequently mentioned include qualified immigration and 
strengthening global solidarity between aging and young societies. Appropriate 
concepts would have to involve more than just migration of qualified workers; 
for example, “old societies” could provide assistance to “young” ones in the 
areas of education and social affairs. 
In the view of many of the experts, all effective risk-mitigation measures are 
conditional on raising public awareness. The public needs to be made aware 
that, as life expectancies increase, people will gradually have to work for longer 
– between 1980 and 2009 in Germany, the retirement age was raised by just 
half a year for men and one year for women (University of Duisburg-Essen 
2010), while the median age of the population rose from 36.4 to 44.3 years 
(UN 2010). Public acceptance of measures that are painful in the short term 
but necessary in the long term also has to be reinforced. 
Public opinion in Germany 
In In the ranking of probabilities for the eleven economic risks, the danger 
of a drop in living standards in Germany as a consequence of an aging society 
comes in somewhere near the bottom, as perceived by the general public. In 
the infas survey, 64 percent of respondents consider this development to be 
“very probable” or “somewhat probable.” Only when it comes to the 
probability of trade wars and pandemics do fewer citizens consider the 
scenario to be probable. On the issue of personal impact, an aging-related fall 
in wealth ranked somewhere in the middle: for 46 percent of those surveyed, 
this macroeconomic trend would have “very high” or “somewhat high” 
impact.  
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Sovereign debt/default 
 
Facts and figures 
The crisis in the eurozone is primarily a sovereign debt crisis. Without the 
support of the European Union, countries such as Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland would have been forced to default – with unforeseeable consequences 
for the euro. The cuts in spending and the tax increases made necessary by the 
crisis place a burden on these hard hit national economies. At the start of 
August 2011, the United States was facing insolvency. Only a last-minute 
compromise between Republicans and Democrats enabling a two-stage raising 
of the legal debt limit from 14.3 to 16.4 billion dollars prevented illiquidity. 
However, these rescue attempts did not eliminate the underlying causes of 
the debt. In combating the negative effects of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
in particular, many states that were already highly indebted have sunk even 
further into debt in recent years. The rescue operations merely allowed the 
governments in question to continue to accumulate debt on the international 
financial market at affordable interest rates.  
These rescue operations have further raised the level of debt. In the crisis 
years between 2007 and 2010, gross sovereign debt in the G7 countries (G20) 
rose from about 82.3 percent of GDP (60.6 %) to 108.8 percent (74.5 %) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts a rise to almost 122 percent 
(78.8 %) in 2015. At a global level, the financial crisis increased the debt level 
from 57.6 percent of global GNP in 2007 to 71.2 percent in 2010 (IMF 
2011a). In real terms, this means a global sovereign debt of about 54 billion 
dollars at the end of 2011. Three quarters of this debt is owed by the United 
States, the EU and Japan (IMF 2011b). 
The IMF considers the critical debt limit to be 90 percent of a country’s 
economic output. The larger the debt, the more funds the state in question has 
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to dedicate to servicing that debt in the future. This reduces financial leeway, 
making it harder to maintain state services without taking on new debt. Added 
to this, many industrialized countries are facing increasing financial outlay in 
their social and health systems due to their aging societies, while 
simultaneously receiving lower tax revenue because of a shrinking workforce.  
The insolvency of a major national economy could decimate the assets of 
many private and institutional investors and result in a crisis of confidence in 
the financial markets, which could spread to previously solvent and healthy 
countries, plunging them into crisis. Banks of systemic importance could get 
into difficulties. A sovereign debt and financial crisis could also endanger the 
international monetary system and, not to be overlooked, a high level of public 
debt increases the risk of inflation because the real value of the debt can be 
reduced by (deliberate) inflation. 
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Key statements on “sovereign debt/default” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
Those who took part in the survey consider the potential global economic 
impact of a major national economy collapsing to be very serious (Fig. 1). This 
view is largely shared by respondents from all the various regions of the world 
– participants from Asia and Africa, like respondents from Europe and the 
United States, believe the increasing debt levels of yet more national 
economies to be very harmful. 
Fig. 1: Potential impact of risk areas on global economy (all respondents) 
 
This is also reflected in the question of the urgency of finding a solution: the 
risk of a major economy collapsing is one of the risk areas for which the 
experts assign the highest priority to finding a solution, again with a broad 
consensus. 
The answers given by the experts to the open question of what the most 
serious economic effects of excessive sovereign debt or sovereign default 
would be show that they do not regard debt as a purely economic issue. In 
fact, their replies suggest that they see it as a possible cause of violent social 
upheaval. 
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The respondents consider that the most important direct economic 
consequences for the economies in question are a downturn in economic 
productivity and a slump in growth, while the most critical indirect 
consequences are the social and political fallout of sovereign default. First and 
foremost, they view the exacerbation of social inequality as a very serious 
problem that could lead to conflicts over distribution and therefore social 
unrest and political instability. In the eyes of respondents, states could even 
completely lose the ability to function. 
The experts are in disagreement on the global consequences of a sovereign 
default, brought about by the intermeshing of national economies. According 
to one view, the loss of confidence on the financial markets would 
automatically drag down other “healthy” economies, setting in motion a global 
down-ward spiral. By contrast, other experts believe that the effects would 
remain manageable. In this view, sovereign default by a major economy would 
shift the global balance of power but it need not necessarily lead to a collapse 
of the global economy.  
The respondents are particularly wary of self-reinforcing effects on the 
financial markets, which are largely beyond the scope of political control. The 
experts are in agreement on the fact that a lasting debt crisis and the threat of 
default would depress global economic output and aggravate worldwide 
inequality of income and wealth. A rise in protectionism and political conflicts, 
coupled with worsening trade relations, are also mentioned by the experts as 
further possible consequences of the collapse of a major economy. 
 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
The experts believe that the subject of sovereign debt/default is relatively 
well understood. At the same time, they unanimously presume that decision 
makers are very concerned about the matter. The level of concern is at a 
similarly high level to the risk of a systemic collapse of the financial markets or 
increasing energy and resource scarcity. The timeliness and political 
explosiveness of the subject no doubt play a significant role here.  
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Despite the high level of concern regarding large sovereign debt and a good 
comprehension of the connections and interrelations, the respondents 
perceive only minimal consensus on suitable countermeasures. On average, 
they give this a score of 2.78 on a scale of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high). When 
asked about the effectiveness of current efforts to find solutions, the experts 
give a similarly moderate response: they award an average score of 3.5, where 
6 represents a very effective approach. 
In terms of a future solution to the problem of debt, the respondents display 
cautious optimism: on average, they assess the probability of finding a future 
solution with a score of 3.73 on a scale of 1 (very improbable) to 6 (very 
probable), giving it one of the highest scores of all the risk areas. However, the 
differences here are slight: nine of the eleven risk areas are clustered together 
(between 3.44 and 3.79). 
In the case of sovereign debt, the respondents deviate significantly from 
their standard response pattern: whereas for most of the risk areas, how the 
experts rate the quality of current efforts to find a solution has a strong 
bearing on how probable they consider a future solution to be, there is no 
connection when it comes to sovereign debt/default. Additionally, those 
experts who consider the issue of sovereign debt to be well understood do not 
find a fast and effective solution to be any more probable. 
Almost 83 percent of those surveyed consider political consensus to be a 
critical factor on the road to successfully combating the problem of debt. 
Participants from OECD countries are substantially more optimistic about a 
future solution than experts from non-OECD countries (Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2:  Probability of averting/mitigating the risk of sovereign debt/default: 
 percentage distribution of the respondents’ assessments 
 
The analysis of the open question about possible solutions shows very 
limited scope for economic approaches, in particular. Although the 
respondents believe that a stable national economy is an important 
prerequisite for over-coming debt crises, they consider economic productivity 
mainly to be a de-pendent factor – they are unanimous in stating that the 
solution must be a political one, given that the problem of debt is in itself a 
political issue. Furthermore, it is clear that approaches at the national level can 
only form part of the solution, at best. 
A majority of the experts emphasize the need for political consensus be-
tween economically influential states on how to handle the problem of 
sovereign debt. For example, there should be binding upper limits on 
sovereign debt for all countries, and national debt policies need to be made 
more trans-parent. 
Last but not least, the experts see stronger regulation of international 
financial markets as a possible solution. According to this theory, the global 
com-munity should set up a global financial market supervisory authority and 
financial market transactions should also be taxed. The experts are optimistic 
about the prospects of success for regulations arising from globally 
coordinated initiatives. 
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Public opinion in Germany 
According to the German citizens surveyed by infas, the likelihood of 
sovereign default occurring somewhere around the world, leading to public 
services cutbacks to the bare minimum, is “very probable” or “somewhat 
probable.” After the risks of a growing gap between rich and poor and 
increasing energy and resource scarcity (both of which developments 92 % of 
those questioned believe likely), this is the risk that is most expected by those 
who took part in the infas survey. Nevertheless, people in Germany believe 
this will have only a minimal impact on themselves. Fewer than half (46 %) 
think that this development would have a “very high” or “somewhat high ” 
impact on their lives. As such, this is one of the dangers with the greatest 
discrepancy between how probable those surveyed believe the risk to be and 
how much they think it will affect them personally. 
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Financial market collapse 
 
Facts and figures 
With the advance of globalization comes increased integration of world 
financial markets, already closely enmeshed. The fortunes of the United States 
and China, for example, are closely tied to each other through foreign 
exchange markets – China holds (as at June 2011) 1.16 trillion dollars, and 
Japan’s dollar reserves, at 911 billion, are also enormous (U.S. Treasury 
Department 2011). The threat of insolvency which loomed over the United 
States in August 2011 demonstrates the extreme danger inherent in such 
advanced integration – if the dollar were to collapse China would also find 
itself in great difficulty. 
At the same time the increasing complexity of new financial products in 
effect reduces the transparency of the markets, without any appreciable 
strengthening of regulation to compensate. The phenomenon of individual 
countries or alliances of countries bailing out banks suggests that even in high-
risk scenarios, banks “of systemic importance” would not be left to completely 
collapse. Therefore managers at such banks are presumably prepared to enter 
into greater risks knowing that the state will serve as guarantor if need be. In a 
highly integrated financial world, this kind of attitude could bring the 
guarantor states to the limit of their capacities in crisis situations. 
The financial crisis of 2008 indeed demonstrated that isolated phenomena 
can influence financial markets around the world and in certain circumstances 
lead to a credit crunch and the large scale write-off of assets. This was exactly 
what happened in the last financial crisis, which was triggered when bad 
housing loans in the United States were packaged into complex financial 
products. 
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The 2008 crisis showed the economic damage that can result from a massive 
drop in share prices and a worldwide credit shortage, and also how difficult it 
is to bring such a situation back under control. Commerzbank estimates the 
economic losses of this financial crisis at 10.5 trillion dollars, consisting of 
write-offs and bankruptcies, loss of property value and costs associated with 
the world economic downturn (Handelsblatt 2009). McKinsey calculated that 
financial assets shrunk by 27 trillion dollars worldwide from 202 trillion at the 
end of 2007 to 175 trillion at 2008 year-end (McKinsey 2011). 
Triggers for a financial crisis include speculation bubbles, as was the case in 
2008 (which effectively involved gambling on housing loans), extreme price 
fluctuations in individual markets or the bankruptcy of a major national 
economy. Faith in the market is essential for a functioning economy and once 
impaired it is extremely difficult to reestablish. And until it is, you can usually 
expect a credit crunch which has a direct impact on the real economic sphere 
and, along with local monetary policy, carries the risk of hyperinflation as long 
as central banks respond with cheap money.  
In a worst-case scenario, the collapse of banks of systemic importance could 
lead to a collapse of the global financial system and to a huge loss in 
worldwide wealth. 
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Key statements on “financial market collapse” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
Given the experiences with the 2008 financial crisis, it is hardly surprising 
that experts rate the potential impact of a financial market collapse the highest 
among all risk areas (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1: Potential impact of risk areas on the global economy (all respondents) 
 
On a scale from 1 (very low) to 6 (very high) they rate the expected 
economic cost of systemic collapse of finance markets at 5.68 – almost the 
maximum. Respondents also accord the priority of finding a solution to the 
financial market dilemma a correspondingly high rating. While on average they 
see a solution as less urgent than is the case with food and water shortage or 
energy and raw material scarcity, the respondents regard a timely response as 
almost as important – on a scale from 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), the 
average priority rating for a solution is 4.9. 
Questioned as to the gravest economic consequence of financial market 
collapse, the experts were highly consistent. As they see it such a collapse 
would see assets disappearing, as it were, into thin air. Further consequences 
include a rationing of credit and a deep-seated crisis of confidence which 
would impede investment activities. And so a systemic collapse of financial 
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markets would soon reach the real economy and, according to the experts, 
trigger a deep recession or even a long-lasting depression. 
Respondents frequently cite a sharp rise in unemployment as well as a loss 
of faith in economic institutions and (inter-)national politics as likely 
consequences. One African participant sees a danger recent economic growth 
in emerging nations might be wiped out as well as a major loss of prosperity in 
broad sections of the middle class, while a German civil society representative 
draws a comparison with the world financial crisis of 1929. 
The consequences outlined, such as rising unemployment and wiping out of 
financial assets, imply a particularly strong burden on the middle class and 
underclass, amounting to redistribution from below to above – the winners 
from the crisis can only be those who possess capital. That being the case, it is 
hardly surprising that many experts predict that a collapse of financial markets 
would be accompanied by social unrest and an increase in social inequality. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
The experts estimate that a collapse of financial markets would have a very 
high impact on the global economy. Accordingly they rate the urgency of 
finding a solution which would reduce financial market risk as very high. In 
contrast to rising socioeconomic inequality or water and food crises, the 
experts’ evaluation corresponds with the perceived awareness of the risk area 
on the part of decision makers – the respondents regard them as extremely 
concerned. In expert opinion only international terrorism causes greater 
concern. 
Despite wide-reaching economic consequences and the recent high media 
profile of the topic, the experts assume only moderate knowledge on the part 
of decision makers. In figures this translates as a rating of 3.09 on a scale from 
1 (very low) to 6 (very high). For this question, the collapse of financial 
markets is on a level with water and food crises and the failure of 
technological infrastructures. Both the significant complexity of many financial 
products and the multi-level integration of international financial markets may 
explain this pessimistic assumption. 
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In the experts’ responses, a strong correlation can be discerned between the 
assumed comprehension of the problem and the priority for finding a 
solution. The lower the respondent estimates comprehension, the more urgent 
they regard a solution for the global financial market dilemma to be. So if the 
experts feel that a high level of comprehension tends to reduce prioritization, 
this can also indicate that the respondents see a profound understanding of 
effective mechanisms and contexts as an important step on the path to a 
solution. 
The experts regard current efforts to find a solution to the dilemma of the 
financial markets rather skeptically, but more positively than for almost all 
other risk areas. On a scale of 1 to 6 they rate it at 3.79, where 6 is the best 
possible rating – only measures to fight international terrorism are rated more 
highly. 
A far greater cause for concern is the perceived low level of consensus 
among decision makers regarding the appropriate solution strategy for the risk 
of systemic collapse of financial markets – an average rating of 2.91 on a scale 
from 1 to 6 (where 1 represents “no consensus whatsoever”) attests to the 
experts’ low confidence in the problem-solving capacities and/or willingness 
to compromise among those responsible. In fact almost 80 percent of survey 
participants regard a lack of political consensus as the greatest obstacle to a 
solution. 
Presumably it is the high potential economic impact as well as the current 
medial omnipresence of the subject of finance markets which makes the 
experts comparatively confident that a solution will be found (Fig. 2). The risk 
area “financial market collapse” ranks first among risk areas at issue, although 
the absolute average rating of 3.79 on a scale of 1 (highly improbable) to 6 
(very probable) is only just over the middle of the scale. Although respondents 
assume that decision makers are still far from compromise or consensus in the 
search for a solution, they clearly regard the pressure to act as so great and 
awareness of the problem as so high, that they regard a quick solution as very 
probable. 
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Fig. 2: Probability of averting/mitigating risks in the future (all respondents) 
 
On the question of the best solution strategies, the experts’ answers are 
highly consistent (as they are on the question of the gravest economic 
consequences). In almost every statement they called for better, stronger 
regulation of the global financial sector (although a few highlighted the danger 
of excessive regulation). Basel II and Basel III attracted particularly harsh 
criticism. On the questions of regulation many experts emphasize the need for 
globally coordinated action – stricter equity requirements for banks and 
globally-coordinated crisis management were among the individual proposals. 
A ban on particularly complex financial instruments could form part of the 
solution. Some experts see the need for an international finance supervisory 
body invested with appropriate authority; one respondent also sees the G20 as 
responsible in this regard. 
The most fundamental proposal questions education and value systems as 
well as incentive systems in the global economy; the regulatory framework is 
surely also a decisive factor here. This proposal would further insist 
compensation be more closely aligned with the social relevance of a given 
occupation, an approach markets are evidently incapable of implementing. 
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All of the experts’ responses have essentially the same thrust: the call for a 
stronger state is clear and unmistakable and the respondents perceive finance 
markets as needing much tighter regulation, regarding current regulations as 
poor and/or insufficient. 
Public opinion in Germany 
A little more than three-quarters of the public interviewed by infas expect 
another speculation bubble: 78 percent of those questioned in Germany 
regard the emergence and subsequent collapse of a bubble, with an 
accompanying stock market crash, as “somewhat probable” or even “very 
probable.” This places it in the upper middle of the eleven risk areas in terms 
of probability. The collapse of a speculative bubble and associated 
consequences represents an eventuality that 55 percent of the public believe 
would have a “very high” or “somewhat high” impact on their own lives. Only 
the growing scarcity of energy and raw materials is perceived by the German 
public as having more potential impact on their lives. 
 
Protectionism/Trade Wars 99 
 
Protectionism/trade wars 
 
Facts and figures 
The growth centers of the global economy are increasingly shifting away 
from the OECD countries to the large emerging countries, particularly to the 
so-called BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India and China. These four national 
economies have already contributed almost as much to the growth of the 
global economy in the first decade of this millennium as the G3 (United 
States, Japan and Germany) and the other eurozone countries.  
Goldman Sachs predicts that the BRIC countries will continue to grow 
stronger in the next ten years, to the extent that they will be responsible for 
around 45 percent of global economic growth, while the contribution of the 
G3 will sink to little more than 20 percent (Goldman Sachs 2010). 
PricewaterhouseCoopers economists forecast the point at which the Chinese 
economy will overtake that of the United States as 2025, The Economist 
predicts they will draw level as soon as 2019 (The Economist 2010). Along 
with the BRIC countries, other emerging nations such as Indonesia, South 
Korea and Vietnam are growing rapidly – Goldman Sachs has designated 
eleven of these countries as the “Next Eleven” group (Goldman Sachs 2009). 
Such dramatic growth would also alter the structure of these national 
economies. Labor markets in China and India can already call on a highly-
qualified workforce. These countries will increasingly be able to offer 
knowledge-intensive products and services and increasingly compete with 
OECD countries. We can also assume that the number of national economies 
able to compete at a high level will steadily rise. At the same time demand for 
resources will increase if current growth paradigms remain unchanged. 
This may prompt government moves to protect their national economies, 
workforces and potentially their strategic industries from international (low-
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cost) competition, and secure access to resources. To achieve these goals they 
may employ such measures as raising import duties, paying subsidies for the 
export economy and manufacturers of import substitutes, influencing the 
exchange rate of their currency or by erecting other regulatory trade barriers.  
Protectionism could also play a decisive role in the conflict around raw 
materials. China, for instance, controls almost the entire global market for rare 
earths, which are essential for many new low-CO2 technologies (NYT 2011). 
Increased protectionism could slow the rate of global economic growth and 
prosperity which would particularly affect both largely export-oriented 
economies and those which are poor in raw materials or small in scale. In the 
event of exchange rate manipulations, painful long-term adjustment responses 
may be required – the huge dollar reserves of China’s central bank mean that 
China’s destiny is more closely aligned with that of the United States than 
either party presumably intended. 
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Key statements on “protectionism/trade wars” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
The experts are unanimous in evaluating the potential consequences for the 
global economy of growing protectionist tendencies or even a trade war as 
high. However this risk area ranks some distance behind the other core 
economic risks such as the collapse of financial markets or the theme of 
sovereign debt/default. 
The survey results show that purely economic effects are not the sole 
decisive factor in the experts’ evaluation of the urgency of a solution. A 
solution to protectionism and trade wars is consequently accorded a relatively 
low priority, although the evaluation of its potential economic impact is 
relatively high. Here the experts give it an average rating of 4.04 on a scale of 1 
to 6 where 6 represents the highest priority; the most pressing risk area as 
defined by respondents has an average rating of 5.12. 
Almost all the experts cite a decline in prosperity as one of the most serious 
economic consequences of protectionism and trade wars. They warn of a loss 
in quality, inhibition of global knowledge transfer and a loss in competition 
and consequently also of innovation. Others emphasize inefficiency and bias 
as well as a drop in global trade volumes with resulting price rises. Economic 
performance may fall overall, while two scientists from Europe even see the 
danger of economic stagnation or collapse. 
In the social domain the respondents fear an increase in inequality, rising 
unemployment and poverty (however without regional differentiation), rising 
extremism, resentment towards other countries and political isolationism. The 
survey participants also warn of a return to nationalism, while one expert even 
sees war as a possible consequence of protectionism. 
The experts believe that the loss of important foreign markets and reduced 
knowledge exchange would have a particularly strong impact on poorer, less 
developed countries.  
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Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
Despite the high rating given to the potential economic impact and the se-
verity of that impact as outlined by the respondents themselves, they accord a 
relatively low priority to solution strategies for trade wars and protectionism. 
This possibly stems from the high level of comprehension at the decision-
making level assumed by the experts in this area. Statistically speaking, 
responses to the question of current solution efforts in the case of 
protectionism and trade wars assume a close link between the quality of those 
efforts and the state of knowledge of the issue.  
In any case, the experts judge concerns among decision makers with respect 
to protectionism and trade wars as the second highest among all the risk areas 
(Fig. 1). Theoretically this could be the reason that solution efforts and 
approaches are evaluated slightly higher than average across all risk areas: 3.5 
on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good) (WTO 2011a). 
Fig. 1: Level of concern about the risk areas on the part of global decision-making 
elites (all respondents) 
 
Compared to other risk areas, the experts rate consensus on available 
solution approaches as relatively high. This could also explain why they regard 
concern among decision makers as relatively low, despite the economic 
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relevance of the topic. However in absolute terms consensus can be described 
as at best rudimentary in the experts’ estimation, especially as the respondents 
themselves offer widely differing evaluations of consensus (Fig. 2). While 
participants from OECD countries rate consensus as fairly high (average of 
3.70 on a scale from 1 to 6), other experts see it as considerably lower (average 
of 2.73). 
Fig. 2: Consensus regarding appropriate measures for mitigating protectionism/ 
 trade wars: percentage distribution of respondents’ assessments  
 
Experts are similarly unsure about the probability of a future solution to this 
dilemma as they are with other risk areas. The distribution of responses is 
greater here than for all other risk areas: The graver the respondent assesses 
the economic impact of protectionism and trade wars, the less likely they 
regard a future solution. 
One reason could be that an assumption of high potential for economic 
damage can make consensus-building and ultimately finding a solution more 
difficult, especially as the experts regard political consensus as a critical factor 
in finding a solution: 32 of the 37 respondents, at 87 percent a higher 
proportion than any other risk area, chose this answer to the question of the 
major barrier to a solution. 
The experts’ response patterns produce a moderately consistent picture 
overall. They assess potential economic impact as relatively high, 4.92 on a 
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scale from 1 to 6 (where 6 is the highest priority). While they may not regard 
current solution strategies particularly positively, they come off better than in 
most other risk areas. The same applies to consensus on the correct approach: 
this is rated relatively highly, though in absolute terms only just over the 
middle of the scale, at 3.5. 
Respondents also rated comprehension of the problem as relatively high, 
which may in part explain why the priority for finding a solution is regarded as 
relatively low: The experts regard the probability of an increase in protectionist 
measures or even trade wars as low. Here the consensus, perceived as 
somewhat greater than for other risk areas, could be one reason why a 
solution is seen as less urgent. 
When asked their opinion on the best solution approaches, most experts 
point to the as-yet unsolved problem of knowledge and perception. In light of 
the significance of a political consensus in the eyes of the respondents it can 
be assumed that this problem of perception relates in particular to the level of 
political decision-making.  
However the respondents also call for public involvement in political 
decision-making: Comprehension of economic contexts and the harmful 
impact of protectionism/trade wars must be championed; not just among 
politicians, but the general population as well. One expert proposes, for 
instance, making basic economics a compulsory part of the curriculum. Others 
advocate strong political leadership which won’t be overly swayed by public 
reservations regarding free trade.  
On a practical level, the experts call for a stronger WTO. If this isn’t 
possible, their second-best solution is strong, credible, multilateral trade 
agreements, with the G8 and G20 countries taking the lead.  
There are other voices, however: One African economist would allow 
poorer countries a certain amount of protectionism to accelerate the catching-
up process, while richer countries would be required to completely open their 
national economies. Another expert proposes a paradigm shift from a purely 
competition-driven economy towards greater cooperation. 
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Public opinion in Germany 
The outbreak of a trade war is the only one of the eleven economic risk 
which less than half of people interviewed by infas expect to actually occur. 
Only 40 percent were of the opinion that this eventuality is “very probable” or 
“somewhat probable.” At the same time trade wars also represent the 
development which would have the least impact on German interviewees’ 
own lives: Only 35 percent believed that a disruption of international trade 
caused by the closing of borders for foreign products would have a “very 
high” or “somewhat high” impact on their own lives. Consequently trade wars 
ranks last of the eleven risk areas for the German public both in terms of the 
probability of it occurring and the level of personal impact. 
 
Pandemic Outbreaks 107 
 
Pandemic outbreaks 
 
Facts and figures 
At the start of the 21st century, experts consider the outbreak of a global 
pandemic to be far more probable than they did in previous decades. The 
World Health Organization has issued warnings about the rise of pathogens 
that are increasingly resistant to medication (WHO 2011). This makes it ever 
harder to treat illnesses and increases fatality rates for previously curable 
diseases. Humanity is on the point of throwing away its medical advances: “In 
the absence of urgent corrective and protective actions, the world is heading 
towards a post-antibiotic era, in which many common infections will no longer 
have a cure and, once again, kill unabated,” said the Director-General of the 
World Health Organization, Dr. Margaret Chan, on World Health Day in 
April 2011. 
The probability of global pandemics is growing because of increasingly well 
adapted, drug-resistant pathogens. In addition, improvements to the world-
wide transport infrastructure, the globalization of the economy and the 
corresponding growth in flows of goods accelerate the spread of germs and 
viruses around the world. International seaborne trade more than tripled in the 
period between 1970 and 2007, increasing from 10,654 to 32,932 billion ton-
miles (BPB 2009). Worldwide airborne passenger capacity rose from 500 
billion passenger-kilometers in 1970 to about 4,100 billion passenger-
kilometers in 2007 – commercial air traffic has increased more than eightfold 
in less than 40 years (BMU 2007). 
Decreasing global biodiversity also plays a role in the faster spread of 
pathogens. Since the mid-1990s, the number of endangered species on the 
Red List issued by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN) has risen from about 10,500 to 19,000 (IUCN 
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2011). This serious disruption to the natural balance encourages the 
proliferation of pests and pathogens.  
If this results in greater numbers of people being harmed, there will also be 
indirect consequences for the economy: sick leave increases and health costs 
soar. If it became necessary to restrict global traffic of goods and people in 
order to contain a pandemic, national economies that rely on global chains of 
supply would suffer greatly. 
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Key statements on “pandemic outbreaks” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
Compared to other risk areas, the experts consider the potential impact on 
the global economy of a pandemic to be below average. Nevertheless, on a 
scale of 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), they give it an average score of 4.48. This 
is roughly comparable to the potential global impact that the experts attribute 
to the diminishing productivity of aging societies or socioeconomic inequality, 
and significantly more than the impact ascribed to the risk of international 
terrorism. Despite this, the respondents assign a relatively low priority to 
finding a solution to the possible outbreak of pandemics; they only consider 
two risk areas to be even less urgent.  
Assessments of the potential impact of a global pandemic on the global 
economy range from a reduction in economic activity and productivity, 
through to a massive economic collapse and the obliteration of certain sectors 
of the economy. One noteworthy example is poultry farming, which has 
already suffered in recent years due to outbreaks of bird flu. Some experts also 
list immobility and diminished social interaction as consequences of a global 
pandemic. Additionally, the greatly increased number of sick people would 
impose a heavy financial burden on health systems, which would increase 
budget deficits in affected countries. 
The experts also mention the psychological consequences of a global 
pandemic. Fear and panic could make the situation worse, according to some 
respondents. Worst case scenario: large numbers of sick people or fatalities 
could make it impossible to continue monitoring or operating critical infra-
structure. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
When it comes to the background knowledge of decision makers and 
academics, the respondents take a more negative view than with almost any 
other risk area; according to the experts, only uncontrolled mass migration is 
less understood (Fig. 1). The respondents also consider the decision makers’ 
level of concern about the outbreak of pandemics to be about average when 
compared to other risk areas, on a similar level to the risk area “technology 
infrastructure failure.” Possibly, from the experts’ perspective, the decision 
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makers do not sufficiently comprehend the issue to be properly concerned 
about it. 
Fig. 1: Comprehension of risk areas on the part of global decision-making elites (all 
 respondents) 
 
The poor comprehension of the situation imputed to decision makers and 
the very inconsistent responses given by the experts suggest that even current 
attempts to reduce the risk of global pandemics would be rated as moderate, at 
best. Indeed, the experts take a very poor view of these endeavors, even if they 
give four other risk areas lower scores. On average, they rate efforts to find 
solutions with a score of 3.12 on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good). 
In their responses, the experts implicitly draw a strong connection between 
comprehension of the problem, on the one hand, and the quality of current 
approaches, on the other – the respondents tend far more clearly than with the 
other risk areas to take a negative view of current efforts if they also consider 
the problem to be poorly understood. This tallies with the fact that most 
respondents list a lack of knowledge or poor comprehension as the key barrier 
to finding a solution – almost half of the experts who took part choose this 
option (Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2:  Key barriers to averting/mitigating the risk of pandemics: percentage 
distribution of all respondents’ assessments 
 
As such, the risk areas “pandemic outbreaks” and “technology infrastructure 
failure” are an exception because for all the other risk areas, a lack of political 
consensus is considered the greatest barrier to finding a solution.  
Although the experts do not consider there to be much consensus on 
appropriate measures to counter the outbreak of pandemics, they are 
noticeably more optimistic here than with many of the other risk areas. On 
average, they give the probability of finding a future solution a score of 3.44 
on a scale of 1 (very improbable) to 6 (very probable), which is more than 
would be expected given the poor comprehension of the problem. Evidently, 
the experts assume that this lack of knowledge can be relatively easily 
overcome. According to these findings, the respondents would appear to 
consider gaps in knowledge to be less intractable than a lack of political 
consensus. 
The overall picture is coherent. In the eyes of the experts, a fundamental 
comprehension of the problem and the closely related issue of proper concern 
at the decision-making level are crucial to finding and implementing effective 
risk-mitigation measures to deal with global pandemics. A lack of knowledge is 
the greatest problem, from the experts’ point of view, although this would 
apparently be relatively easy to remedy. 
In answer to the open question of which measures they consider particularly 
effective at reducing the risk of global pandemics, many of the respondents 
mention intensified research or, more generally, generating knowledge – in this 
area, too, the replies are very consistent. In addition to increasing research 
funding, the experts also consider international cooperation in research to be 
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important here – this would prevent inefficient parallel research and 
investigators in the various regions of the world would benefit from their 
colleagues’ experience and knowledge of pathogens endemic to other 
continents. 
The second focus of the replies is on promoting better monitoring of global 
developments, in order to create something approaching an early warning 
system for the outbreak of pandemics. A constant exchange of information 
and data must be ensured if the race against the clock is to be won, if and 
when the worst happens. This would also require the courage to temporarily 
bring global traffic and transport infrastructure to a standstill. 
Public opinion in Germany 
Pandemics are among the risks that the German public considers least likely 
to occur. Sixty percent of those questioned by the infas survey consider the 
outbreak of a pandemic to be “very probable” or “somewhat probable.” Only 
the probability of a trade war scores lower, at 40 percent. On the issue of 
personal impact, however, pandemics rank relatively high up: 50 percent of 
German citizens believe that a pandemic would have a “very high” or 
“somewhat high” impact on their lives. Taken together with the potential 
paralyzation of the global economy’s lifelines, it represents the third-highest 
score for the eleven risks infas asked about. Only the bursting of a speculative 
bubble and an increasing scarcity of energy and resources would have a 
significant impact on the lives of a greater proportion of the people surveyed. 
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Technology infrastructure failure 
 
Facts and figures 
As the global economy’s multifaceted technological infrastructures become 
more complex, the overall system’s resistance to disruptions becomes 
correspondingly greater. Yet this increasing complexity is simultaneously 
rendering technological infrastructures ever more vulnerable by creating more 
potential points of attack and making them increasingly difficult to protect. 
Information technology (IT) infrastructures in particular play a key role in 
this trend. Given the rise of smart phones and the ongoing digitalization of 
numerous areas of life, it can be assumed that the potential for danger in this 
area will continue to rise. According to the U.S.-based Internet Crime 
Complaint Center (IC3), the annual loss associated with Internet crime in the 
United States has risen from essentially zero in 2001 to more than a half a 
billion dollars at last tally (IC3 2010). The sophistication of the tools used, and 
thus also the risk potential associated with individual attacks is rising steadily 
(CNN 2011). 
A number of events in recent years illustrate this development well. The 
integration of production facilities into information infrastructures enabled the 
Stuxnet virus to wreak considerable damage in Iran’s atomic facilities – and 
probably beyond – starting in mid-2009. In April 2011, hackers cracked Sony 
Online Entertainment security systems, forcing the company to admit that the 
personal data of at least 77 million users had been stolen, including 12,700 
credit card numbers (PC World 2011). In 2007, hackers also gained access to 
the credit card numbers of more than 94 million customers of U.S. retail chain 
TJX (New York Times, 2007).  
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A computer virus similar to Stuxnet could also be used to attack trading 
systems operated by international stock exchanges, international air traffic 
control systems or power supply networks. 
However, it is not only IT infrastructures that are at risk. Technical failures, 
human error, cyber or terror attacks, natural catastrophes and climate change 
all pose ongoing threats of damage to other infrastructures, or are associated 
with prohibitive risk-management costs. Extreme weather phenomena could 
significantly restrict shipping traffic and global trade; further increases in 
international piracy could have similar consequences. In areas of significant 
rainfall, increased flooding would make it difficult to maintain transportation 
infrastructure in the middle to long term without very considerable effort.  
The Fukushima catastrophe showed how extensively a localized event can 
affect the supply chains of a globally interconnected world. It demonstrated 
clearly that even highly developed industrial states are ultimately vulnerable to 
the forces of nature. The failure of technological infrastructures must be 
deemed a real possibility. The collapse of a critical infrastructure could have 
far-reaching economic consequences.  
Fundamentally, a certain loss of confidence and an associated transitory 
market paralysis is always to be expected. In addition, a constriction of 
worldwide mobility is conceivable, perhaps as a result of the failure of air 
traffic control systems. A collapse or the manipulation of IT infrastructure 
important to financial markets could lead to unforeseeable turbulence in the 
financial world. High-risk technologies such as nuclear energy have the 
potential to make whole regions uninhabitable for long periods of time. 
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Key result for “technology infrastructure failure” 
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Global relevance of the risk area 
Because this survey was conducted shortly after the catastrophe in 
Fukushima, it can be assumed that the results have been influenced by events 
there. The experts rated the extent of economic damage associated with the 
collapse of a technological infrastructure as high, comparable with the effects 
of excessive sovereign debt or protectionism and trade wars. On a scale from 
1 (very low) to 6 (very high), they rated the potential global impact at an 
average of 5.0.  
Nonetheless, by assigning an average value of 4.14 on a scale of 1 to 6 
(where 6 represents a very high priority), they give measures aimed at 
minimizing the vulnerability of technological infrastructures only medium 
priority in comparative perspective, though this rating is rather high in 
absolute terms. One reason for this could be the high complexity and rapid 
change of technological infrastructure, which complicates concrete risk 
mitigation measures and makes dealing with other risk areas appear more 
urgent. However, it is also conceivable that, having engaged in research on the 
issue, experts expect companies to produce solutions for technological 
infrastructures’ security problems. 
In response to the open question on the most serious economic 
consequences of the failure of technological infrastructures, the experts 
identified a range of issues. For instance, damage to the global economy could 
result from investment barriers raised following a collapse of global supply 
chains and a loss of confidence in the functioning of economic systems. The 
collapse of core infrastructures could lead to a period of protracted economic 
stagnation, as the globalized economy is strongly dependent on functioning 
information, communication and transportation infrastructures. 
Respondents also saw the operational capacity of governments and 
institutions as being at risk; this in turn could affect global markets that require 
institutional stability for smooth functioning. The failure of an important 
infrastructure could lead to the collapse of regional markets, with possible 
global effects due to the strongly interconnected nature of the global 
economy.  
118 The Economic Risks of Globalization 
 
 
Along with economic consequences, the experts in some cases also 
mentioned issues such as terrorism and espionage. The impossibility of perfect 
protection, particularly of IT infrastructures, significantly facilitates espionage 
activities. Social unrest was also identified as a possible consequence of the 
failure of technological infrastructure. 
Comprehension of the problem and risk-mitigation measures 
Just as they themselves accord solutions to the problem of technological 
infrastructure failure a comparatively low priority, survey participants see 
decision makers as devoting only an average level of concern to this theme – 
indeed, in respondents’ eyes, issues such as international terrorism, turmoil in 
global financial markets, or energy and raw materials shortages dominate the 
agenda.  
On a scale from 1 (very low) to 6 (very high), the experts rate 
comprehension of the causes, mechanisms and consequences of the failure of 
technological infrastructures at the comparatively low average level of 3.71 
(Fig. 1).  
This could help explain the rather moderate level of perceived concern 
exhibited by decision makers: Across all areas of risk, answers to the questions 
on risk-area comprehension and decision makers’ level of concern showed a 
strong correlation. Survey respondents may have deemed decision makers to 
be comparatively unconcerned because they deemed the level of outstanding 
knowledge on the issue to be fairly low, and thus had little faith in leaders’ 
ability to understand the consequent potential for disruption.  
The lack of comprehension also explains the current approach to managing 
the risk of technological infrastructure failure, and the consensus as to 
appropriate solutions. The experts gave both areas an average score of 3.04 on 
a scale of 1 to 6 (with 6 corresponding to very good solution strategies as well 
as to very broad consensus on appropriate measures).  
 
Technology Infrastructure Failure 119 
 
Fig. 1:  Comprehension of risk areas on the part of global decision-making elites (all 
respondents) 
 
 
Given the perception of a rather low level of comprehension, rather poor 
risk management efforts and a rather low consensus as to the appropriate 
course of action, it is surprising that the probability of future aversion is in fact 
rated as highly as in the risk areas of energy and resource scarcity or aging 
societies. On a scale from 1 (very improbable) to 6 (very probable), experts 
gave this an average value of 3.67.  
One explanation for this might be that in contrast to almost all other risk 
areas, experts do not see the lack of political consensus as the primary 
obstacle, but rather see the lack of awareness of the problem as the primary 
barrier to a solution (Fig. 2). Indeed, in all risk areas, experts saw the average 
probability of future solutions more optimistically the less they identified a 
lack of political consensus as the main obstacle to solution. 
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Fig. 2: Key barriers to averting/mitigating the risk of technological infrastructure 
 failure: percentage distribution of all respondents’ assessments 
 
 
When queried as to their opinions on the most appropriate potential 
solutions, the experts emphasized in particular the importance of raising 
public and decision-maker awareness of the issues associated with 
technological infrastructure failure. In this sense, the answers were thus 
consistent with the frequent mention of a lack of awareness as the main 
obstacle to a solution. The same applies to a lack of knowledge; many 
respondents saw better comprehension of the issue as part of any potential 
solution.  
The experts’ answers also contained a number of technologically driven 
potential solutions. One expert, a scholar in Niger, suggested running critical 
operations on a dual infrastructure system, thus ensuring a maximal level of 
redundancy and security. The prospect of an enhanced and permanent use of 
specialists tasked with uncovering vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures – so-
called red teams – also drew enthusiasm. 
In general, answers to the open question on best potential solutions 
confirmed the assumption that the technological infrastructure failure risk area 
has a certain “black-box” character, the understanding of which could be 
critical to reducing vulnerability, and thus could also contribute to reducing 
risks. 
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Public opinion in Germany 
About two-thirds of respondents to an infas poll in Germany consider it 
“very probable” or “somewhat probable” that a natural catastrophe or a terror 
attack could severely disrupt normal economic activity by severing major 
economic arteries. This places the issue in the view of German citizens in the 
lower middle of the ranking of risk probabilities. However, Germans see 
themselves as being relatively strongly affected on a personal level by such 
developments. Fifty percent of respondents said the blockage of global 
economic flows would have a “very high” or “somewhat high” impact on their 
lives. This is the third-highest value among risk areas, equal to that of 
pandemic outbreaks. Only the bursting of a speculative bubble and increasing 
energy and resource scarcity were viewed by a larger percentage of people as 
likely to have a major impact on their lives. 
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An expanded understanding of economic risks 
Distinguishing from the classic concept of risk 
The economic crises of recent years, from the financial market crisis to the 
massive debts accumulated by leading Western economies and Japan, testify to 
the growing interconnectedness and vulnerability of the global economy. 
Global economic risks have moved increasingly into the focus of public 
perception. Economic decision-making is increasingly exposed to high levels 
of instability and uncertainty. Global economic mechanisms often appear to 
be imperfectly understood, or their considerable complexity seems to be 
imperfectly captured in mainstream economic thinking and decision-making, 
as is the case with the “Homo economicus” model of neoclassical economic 
theory. Does this mean that risks within the global economy will in the future 
be perpetually incalculable?  
The answer depends in large part on what we mean by a global economic 
risk. For the present study, this issue is of crucial importance. The analysis of 
systemic risks within the global economy – the potential impacts of which are 
significantly increased through interaction with other risks – places specific 
demands on the underlying concept of risk. In order to map the layout of 
future risk constellations plausibly, one must begin with an analysis that 
extends beyond the traditional understanding of risk. More specifically, this 
means including risks that derive from causes lying outside the economic 
sphere, as well as risks with effects that play out outside this sphere.  
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At first glance, risk primarily involves one possible form of observation – 
that is, a risk assessment is dependent on what the observer knows and does 
not know. Classical risk analysis, as takes place in insurance economics, studies 
the relationships between specific choices primarily under the assumption that 
risks can be assessed, in the sense of quantifying uncertainty. For example, in 
the case of climate change, a calculation of the probability of natural disasters 
and the potential associated damage is made. However, the non-insured 
middle- and long-term economic consequences remain unexamined.  
The analysis of global economic risks, by contrast, requires a significantly 
larger frame of reference. The observational perspective consequently shifts 
from individual risks to complex constellations of risk, which exert 
considerable influence on the global economic system, and which are 
quantifiable and assessable to only a limited degree. The study of systemic 
risks requires a multidimensional understanding of risks that encompasses 
both de facto validity and social validity. 
For this reason, in order to be considered an economic risk, something must 
first be recognized as a de facto risk by the scientific community, particularly 
economists, as well as by political and economic decision makers. There is no 
objective criterion for the de facto validity of an economic risk; it is far more 
critical whether it is perceived and communicated as such. Ultimately, then, 
one can speak of an economic risk if it makes a difference in specific decision-
making behavior, if the risk is considered as a premise for economic decisions, 
and if in the event of its occurrence, it has an effect on the economic system.  
In addition, we understand economic risks to be problems that affect 
multiple areas of society. The assessment of risk potential and particularly the 
handling of risk depends to a large extent on whether or not the individual can 
have an active influence on the risky choice, and whether or not he or she is 
personally affected. This circumstance creates an enormous potential for 
conflict, which is characteristic of the social dimension of risk. The social 
dimension of risk thus includes the diverging interests of the stakeholders 
dealing with the risks.  
In seeking to understand economic risks, therefore, studying a risk solely 
from the standpoint of its de facto validity is insufficient. Rather, the social 
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validity of risks must also be kept in focus, as the question of whether decision 
makers and those who will be (potentially) affected agree on potential 
solutions has substantial impact on the risk itself. 
 
Risk as a micro- and macroeconomic decision-making problem 
Economic risks can initially be divided into microeconomic risks, which 
primarily affect company business decisions such as investment 
determinations or strategic positioning, and macroeconomic risks, which 
affect large-scale economic relationships such as the development of business 
cycles as well as underlying sociostructural conditions. These two risk contexts 
can in general be described and assessed using the techniques of business 
economics and macroeconomics. However, broadening this understanding to 
include the socioeconomic context enables all risks that are or could be 
meaningful for economic decisions to be included. These include social and 
political risks, as well as technological, environmental and economic risks.  
Within this complex concept of risk, then, what characterizes a global 
economic risk? Risks arise wherever decisions are made. The moment that 
alternatives present themselves, and a choice must be made, a situation 
becomes risky. From a decision-theoretical perspective, the presence of 
alternatives distinguishes risk from (alternative-poor) threat. Although threats 
such as previously unforeseen events or catastrophes can be extremely 
relevant for the global economy, they do not represent problems of decision-
making. If they do become treated as premises for decisions, then they are 
risks. The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington represent an example of 
a threat that following its realization has been increasingly integrated into 
decision-making processes, thus being treated as a risk. 
The distinction between threat and risk is also dependent on the choice of 
decision-making premises. A known threat can be treated as a risk, because 
decisions can refer to it. To this extent, a decision’s degree of risk ultimately 
depends on the knowledge available to the decision makers. Because the 
results of a decision necessarily lie in the (unknown) future, however, 
knowledge alone cannot protect against the uncertainty of decisions. In this 
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context, all that can be done is to speak of relative certainty as compared to 
relative uncertainty.  
Relative certainty comes about when one seeks to anticipate risks, 
integrating them into the premises for a decision. Whether something like 
demographic change represents risk to a business or the macroeconomy thus 
depends on decision makers’ perceptions and expectation. For this reason, it is 
possible for developments within an organization or economy’s surrounding 
environment that initially are not perceived as risks to later take on a 
significant role as powerful factors in economic decisions. Time frames also 
present a difficulty in dealing with risk. Because decisions are often based on 
expectations of continuity, future risks, even those with precursors evident in 
the present, often remain unrecognized. 
 
Definition and research assumptions 
In summary, then, the expanded understanding of economic risk described 
here aims to take account not just of micro- and macroeconomic factors, but 
also of the (global) constellations of socioeconomic risk that affect businesses 
and economies. For this reason, it is not enough to focus on individual risk; 
rather, it is necessary to take account of complex and emerging interactions 
between various risks, as well as the of impact of the various perceptions of 
risk held by actors and groups of actors.  
In accordance with this understanding, economic risks can be defined as risks whose 
sources lie in societal, technological, economic and/or political developments, the impact of 
which unfold within the global economy. They must therefore be observable as economically 
relevant risks, and be able to be treated as problems of economic decision-making.  
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Fig. 1: Approaches to an expanded understanding of economic risks  
 
From this understanding of risk can be derived two premises for the 
description and assessment of future risk potential, both of which serve to 
guide this study:  
1. A high de facto risk potential primarily arises when the level of potential 
damage to the global economy associated with a risk is assessed to be high. In 
addition, the risk increases if it is poorly recognized, if there is little experience 
in dealing with the risk, and the underlying mechanisms are insufficiently 
understood. 
2. From a social perspective, the potential for conflict associated with risks is 
of central importance. The lower the consensus as to the risk and possible 
courses of action, the more difficult it will be to deal with the risk. To that 
extent, the degree of consensus between relevant act actors with regard to the 
risk itself, as well as to possible solutions, represents an important criterion in 
assessing the risk potential. 
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Methodology in selecting risk areas 
Starting point 
Translating our expanded understanding of risk into methodological terms is 
a precondition for its use in any survey. Because no individual economic risks 
will be described and analyzed, but rather environmental developments that 
hold potential risks for the global economy, so-called risk areas were chosen as 
the survey’s starting point. Risk areas are multifaceted environmental 
developments and interrelated series of consequences that have high relevance 
for future economic development.  
A first challenge was to develop a suitable process for selecting the risk areas 
to be analyzed by the participating experts. The final selection had to reflect 
the theoretical constraints of the underlying concept of risk, and be broad 
enough to encompass both known risks and those that have received 
comparatively less attention. At the same time, the candidates had to be able 
to be dealt with in a survey framework. Therefore, a second necessary step was 
to create a suitable description of risk fields, in which the essential facts were 
described, but without anticipating the implications and evaluations of 
potential risks. The risk area descriptions subsequently formed the foundation 
of the actual expert survey.  
 
Identifying risk areas 
The first step in identifying risk areas was based on a multi-part analysis of 
megatrends, which included both continuities (i.e., an extrapolation of existing 
global trends) and discontinuities (i.e., breaks with previous trends). 
Megatrends are processes of transformation that can be empirically and clearly 
demonstrated to be long term, and which have a global reach. The megatrend 
concept originally comes from U.S. futurologist John Naisbitt, whose work 
provided the field of scientific futures research with a foundational 
methodological procedure in the analysis of global trends. Since megatrends 
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are stable over a time horizon of multiple decades, and have comprehensive 
impacts in all world regions, they provide reliable information on future 
challenges for societal, economic and political actors. 
At the same time, megatrends have a high level of inherent complexity, 
which is particularly significant with respect to regional variations. The global 
trend of demographic change, for example, is precipitating a massive aging of 
the population both in post-industrial societies such as Europe or Japan and in 
the economically developing China; however, in many emerging and 
developing countries, the same trend is leading primarily to massive 
population growth. In addition to regional aspects, functional and structural 
factors contribute to the complexity of megatrends. It can thus be assumed 
that in some circumstances, corporate decision makers might develop 
different perspectives on the risks and solutions associated with long-term 
megatrends than would actors from politics, academia or the media.  
The present analysis draws on a selection of 20 megatrends that have been 
successfully used by Z_punkt The Foresight Company in performing futures 
analyses and developing strategies for public institutions and businesses. As a 
rule, the analysis of megatrends is based on the extrapolation of key empirical 
indicators, identification of the most important drivers, and an impact analysis 
within the context of the specific issue under examination. The advantage of 
the megatrend approach in an analysis of risk potential lies in its 
comprehensive perspective: Alongside purely economic factors of influence, it 
allows future developments holding the potential for significant economic 
relevance to be included, even if their sources or impacts lie outside the 
economic sphere. 
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Fig. 2: Megatrends – A starting point for risk identification 
 
 
Because economic risks often arise from the interaction of various 
environmental trends, the analysis of megatrends was supplemented by the 
additional methodological step of cross-impact analysis. Using this method, 
the interactions of two megatrends can be examined. The primary focus in this 
task is on discovering which specific risks for the global economy result from 
the interaction of two long-term global trends. In fact, a variety of megatrends 
are in themselves consistent, meaning that they show no internal 
contradictions and are not mutually exclusive. This additional analytical step 
thus represents an expansion and deepening of the megatrend analysis, 
capturing issues that are underrepresented in the public discourse. 
Continuity and discontinuity 
Both analytical processes were initially carried out under an assumption of 
continuity – that is, the assumption that the future course of development 
would remain stable. The risks in this case can be derived from the 
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megatrends themselves, as they involve specific constellations of risk that 
emerge as developments evolve over the long term. The megatrends and their 
interrelationships are thus systematically analyzed for potential risks to the 
overall interactions of the global economy. In essence, the results of the 
continuity analysis reflect the current scientific and media discourse on global 
economic risks. 
Fig. 3: Process design – Analysis of continuity and discontinuity 
 
 
The fact that many of the long-term trends are well-recognized and in many 
respects also well understood can be seen as an indicator of their high 
relevance within the economic risk discourse. However, under our concept of 
risk, the pure focus on an assumption of continuity is problematic, because 
risk potentials tend to remain unrecognized. In this respect, the analysis of 
discontinuities enables a view of risks that are comparatively unknown, but are 
no less relevant. Megatrends are stable over long periods of time, but are by 
no means immutable. Breaks in trends (disruptions) have enormous 
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consequences for economic relationships, because they typically have not been 
previously accounted for.  
The first phase of discontinuity analysis examines the potential risks arising 
from an interrupted megatrend. What would happen, for example, if 
demographic change were to quickly shift direction, and birth rates in 
previously aging societies were to suddenly rise? Or what would happen if 
criticism of globalization increased to such an extent that states saw 
themselves as forced to close off their national economies from the world 
market? The analysis particularly reflects the fact that disruptions represent a 
break in the structure of expectations, and therefore can hardly be addressed 
using standard methods of economic risk analysis.  
The cross-impact analysis, looking both at potential trend disruptions and 
trend continuities, represents an expansion and deepening of the previous 
analysis. Which impacts might prompt the progressive individualization of 
society to produce a sudden increase in births, and which economic 
consequences might precipitate this constellation of forces? What would the 
challenges to the economy be if globalization continues, but leads to 
increasing resentment of cultural diversity and a return to traditional ways of 
life? The analysis focuses particularly on interactions between megatrends, as 
these often influence multiple reference frames simultaneously, thus creating 
very complex patterns of risk.  
Within this second phase of discontinuity analysis, the plausibility of 
disruptions is an important criterion. Disruptive events with comparatively 
low plausibility – we speak in this case of risks with a wildcard character – 
must be clearly distinguished from the impact that the disruption of one trend 
might have on a second trend. Against the background of our current 
understanding of risk, wildcards can best be characterized as threats, which 
due to their low plausibility are not treated as an economic decision problem, 
or are done so in only a very limited way. The disruption of two megatrends 
simultaneously is also deemed to be a wildcard; this type of scenario is 
correspondingly excluded from the analysis.  
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Formation of risk areas 
The continuity analysis was able to identify a total of 53 individual risks, 
while the discontinuity analysis identified an additional 87. Throughout, it was 
clear that there were significant overlaps and redundancies within each 
analytical section as well as between the continuity and discontinuity analyses. 
At this point, a cluster analysis was used in order to separate the factors 
(individual risks) into internally similar groups.  
The resulting clusters form risk areas, each composed of a variety of 
individual risks that themselves reference multiple facets and domains. Thus, 
for example, the cluster or risk area “protectionism/trade wars” contains 
individual risks that themselves fall variously into the Society, Economy and 
Politics categories. Specifically environmental risks, which fall into the cluster 
or risk area “Food and water scarcity,” are also part of the Society, Economy, 
Environment and Politics categories. Overall, 30 risk areas were able to be 
formed in this way, 13 of which involve risks derived exclusively from the 
continuity analysis, seven with risks exclusively from the discontinuity analysis, 
and an additional 10 with risks drawn from both blocks.  
With an eye to the scope of the expert survey, as well as to keeping relevant 
systemic economic risks distinct, these risk areas were subjected to an 
additional cross-impact analysis, aimed specifically at examining 
interdependencies between the impacts of individual factors. The strongly 
interconnected risk areas were selected; these were distinguished by a 
particularly large number of interdependencies, thus demonstrating active 
impact on other risk areas as well as being passively influenced by others. 
From this analytical process came the 11 risk areas that were ultimately 
evaluated by participants in the study: 
 
1. Food and water scarcity  
2. Energy and resource scarcity  
3. Socioeconomic gaps 
4. Uncontrolled mass migration  
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5. International terrorism 
6. Aging societies  
7. Sovereign debt/default  
8. Financial market collapse  
9. Protectionism/trade wars  
10. Pandemic outbreaks  
11. Technology infrastructure failure  
Expert survey methodology  
Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire for the online survey was designed so that each risk area 
could be processed separately, while composed of the same questions. Each 
part of the questionnaire contained a description of the risk area, in which the 
core issues were identified; in some optional cases, facts were cited providing 
empirical support for the constitution of the risk area. This was designed to 
encourage participants to provide assessments in risk areas that lay outside 
their actual expertise.  
Following the risk area description was the actual questionnaire, a survey 
using a rating-scale system. The questions referred directly to the assumptions 
derived initially from the underlying risk concept, thus bringing both the de 
facto and social risk dimensions into focus. Many of the questions – 
particularly those addressing the degree of impact associated with risks or 
possible solutions – also left open a blank in the temporal/spatial dimension, 
an essential criterion in the analysis of risk area relevance. 
The factual quality of the risk area was the initial subject of query, with a 
discussion of the core issues critical to the determination of risk. This served 
to address the issues of attention, understanding and knowledge with respect 
to the risk itself, as well as risk management. This first block of questions was 
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aimed explicitly at capturing the professional expertise of experts and decision 
makers.  
The second block of questions discussed the concrete economic impact that, 
in the view of the expert, would be exerted by a risk area on the global 
economy as a whole. The experts were first asked to classify the impact at the 
global level, then with respect to their own region. This enabled an analysis to 
be made as to how strong the impact was judged to be relative to the global 
average. The subsequent open question asked participants to outline any 
concrete economic consequences.  
The third block of questions was directed at the solubility of risks in general, 
and particularly at solutions drawn from the individual expert's organizational 
point of view. Here, the temporal aspects of the question were critical. Thus, 
experts were initially asked to evaluate the degree of urgency behind solutions 
in the particular risk area. The next section dealt with the implementation of 
possible solutions; participants were asked whether decision makers were 
addressing the problem, and had already taken steps toward managing the risk.  
The final block of questions dealt with the social dimension of risk, raising 
the issue of the risk area’s potential for conflict. Participants were first asked 
about the degree of consensus between various decision makers in dealing 
with the risk area. In the second open question, participants had the 
opportunity to identify and discuss what they held to be the largest barriers to 
managing the risk. 
The questionnaire’s design was intended to enable the most extensive 
possible evaluation and analysis of results, with particular value being placed 
both on relationships between individual questions and between blocks of 
questions. Moreover, the analysis integrates metadata on the regional origin 
and professional expertise of the individual experts, all of which was captured 
at the time of registration.  
Scope and spectrum of participants 
The study’s specific underlying concept of risk had clear implications for the 
spectrum of desired participants. For a start, we had defined risk as a problem 
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of decision-making. This implied that the survey had to be addressed to 
decision makers who were confronted with risk in the context of their 
professional activities. Additionally, there was a need to survey experts drawn 
from non-economic contexts, given the requirement that economic risks not 
be limited to a purely economic set of interdependencies, but viewed rather as 
cross-sectoral and cross-system challenges. Figures from politics and civil 
society were represented strongly within this latter non-economic group. An 
additional premise was related to the study’s global perspective, and the 
observation that risk environments in various regions of the world develop 
differently, and above all can be perceived differently. The survey is thus 
addressed to an international panel.  
The panel consisted of 70 experts, broken down by world region as follows: 
 
Europe and Russia 37 participants 
Asia  9 participants 
Latin America  9 participants 
Africa  7 participants 
USA and Canada   5 participants 
Middle East   3 participants 
Broken down by field of professional activity, the panel was composed as 
follows: 
 
Academia  26 participants 
Politics 17 participants 
Economics 16 participants 
Civil society, media 11 participants 
 
The heterogeneity of the participants enables an evaluation of global 
economic risk that takes account of specific regional and sectoral viewpoints. 
This is shown particularly in the responses to the open questions, in which the 
experts in general drew significantly on their individual professional 
experiences. In this way, the survey succeeded in presenting a quite 
comprehensive picture of the context-dependent nature of the evaluation of 
global economic risks. 
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Globalization and its Complexity:  
Challenges to Economic Policy 
Jan Arpe 
 
Old risks in new bottles 
The risks explored in the previous chapters are not in their essence new: the 
scarcity of resources critical to survival, speculative bubbles, extreme social 
inequality, migrating populations, epidemics, terrorism and even state 
bankruptcies have long been a part of the fabric of human life.: 
 In his book “Collapse,” Jared Diamond argues compellingly that the 
inhabitants of Easter Island handled their scarce timber resources so 
wastefully that the civil war triggered by the issue ultimately destroyed 
their entire culture (Diamond 2005). 
 The Netherlands’ notorious tulip mania ended in 1637 with the collapse of 
a speculative bubble. Previously, tulip bulb prices had soared as tulips 
became collectors’ items for which exorbitant amounts of money 
exchanged hands.  
 Triggered by the invasion of the Huns in the fourth century, mass 
migrations took place across Europe for the next 200 years. 
 The Black Death, the great plague pandemic that lasted from 1347 to 
1353, spread across the whole of Europe and led to an estimated 25 
million deaths, about one-third of the population at the time. 
 The “German Autumn” of 1977 marked the climax of a wave of terrorism 
in Germany. Among other events, this involved the murder of Hanns 
Martin Schleyer, president of the Confederation of German Employers’ 
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Associations, and the hijacking of the Lufthansa airplane “Landshut.” 
Beyond Germany’s RAF, the 1970s saw the formation of terrorist groups 
in other European countries, such as the IRA in Ireland, the ETA in Spain 
and the BR in Italy.  
 At the end of 2001, Argentinian President de la Rúa declared his country 
unable to repay its debts. Three years previously, the country had been 
plunged into a recession that led to capital flight, a banking crisis, 
excessive government indebtedness and inflation. 
Some crises have led to radical societal changes, while others have plunged 
whole cultures into collapse. It seems as though one would only have to look 
back precisely enough, carefully analyzing the past and drawing appropriate 
conclusions, in order to find the correct responses to the risks of modernity. 
However, there is a significant difference between the crises of the past and 
today’s threats. Indeed, the context has radically changed. At issue are no 
longer simply regional cultures, or catastrophes with primarily local effects. At 
stake today is all of humanity, as a look back at a century featuring two world 
wars, a cold war and a nuclear arms race illustrates. Today, global resource 
shortages loom, the entire world economy is shaken by finance crises, 
worldwide mass migrations due to climate change and severe developmental 
differences can be foreseen, and terrorist attacks like that on 11 September 
2001 in New York shift perceptions of security worldwide. And it is virtually 
unimaginable what a global pandemic might mean, or what global implications 
the bankruptcy of a major economy such as that of the United States, Japan or 
significant European countries might hold.  
Rapid technological developments have enabled human activities to have 
impacts as strong as those of natural influences; human-induced climate 
change is only the most prominent example. Atmospheric chemist and Nobel 
Prize winner Paul Crutzen goes so far as to speak of a new geological era, the 
“Anthropocene” (Crutzen 2002). Yann Arthus-Bertrand’s film “Home” 
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illustrates in breathtaking images just how we humans have changed the planet 
in the last 60 years.1 
In the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the globalization process has 
once again accelerated immensely. The global interdependence of political, 
economic and social systems has produced unprecedented complexity. The 
risks of a globalized world are substantially different from the risks of the past 
– in terms of potential damage, temporal dimension, geographical scope, 
irreversibility, potential for social conflict and mutual interdependencies.  
The interplay of global megatrends such as economic globalization, 
demographic development, climate change and technological progress 
amplifies the influence of local events through reciprocities and feedback 
effects. As a result, conventional problem-solving strategies are failing. In part 
due to the border-constrained nature of national policymaking, these strategies 
are generally effective at the regional level only. They are too often oriented 
toward specific trends, and are informed by models whose idealized 
assumptions are helpful under readily comprehensible conditions, but which 
lose legitimacy when confronted with the complexity of globally 
interconnected systems.  
The global economy as a dynamic network 
The structural changes in the global economy stand out when one sees 
economic activity as part of a dynamic network. The objects within this 
network are the market actors, the economic goods, the factors of production, 
the available information, etc.2. The quantity of these objects is a measure of 
the size of the network. The objects stand in varying relationships to one 
another: Market actors interact with one another, certain factors of production 
 
1 www.youtube.com/user/homeproject 
2 We do not aim here to provide an exact definition of the network model, but rather the 
idea of a meta-model illustrating structural changes. 
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are needed to produce a good, market actors have access to certain bits of 
information, and so on.  
These dependencies can be abstractly represented by links between the 
objects. The average number of links per object is a measure of the 
interconnectedness of the system as a whole3. Both the objects and the links 
between them have very widely varying properties. For example, market 
players have varying preferences, natural resources are distributed very 
unevenly from a geographical perspective, access to information is sometimes 
better and sometimes worse, etc. Indicators of this variance measure the 
heterogeneity of the network4. Of course, because we are dealing with a dynamic 
network, the objects and the links within the network change over time. 
Indicators of the rate of change measure the dynamics of the network. 
Table 1 outlines how the global economy changes in terms of size, 
complexity, heterogeneity and dynamism in the course of global 
transformation. 
The Atlas of Economic Complexity (Hausmann et al. 2011) deals with these 
changes in great detail. In summation, the particular challenge lies in the fact 
that all of humanity today lives and interacts within a single large, highly 
networked, very heterogeneous and highly dynamic system. 
 
 
 
 
 
3 This is a very simple measure of the degree of interconnectedness. Other graph-
theoretical indicators such as connectivity numbers or expansion properties describe other 
aspects of global networking. 
4 For example, consider here indicators such as the Atkinson measure, or the Gini or Theil 
indices, which although used primarily for the measurement of income and wealth 
inequalities, are in principle applicable to any statistical distribution. 
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Table 1:  Global economic changes in four dimensions 
 
 
Decision-making in a complex world 
The evolution of the global economy is determined by: 
 the decisions and actions of its actors (individuals, groups, institutions); 
and  
 the repercussions of these decisions and actions within the system.  
Decisions themselves are driven by individual needs and convictions, social 
norms, economic conditions, political environments and technological 
• More market actors
• Larger market volumes
• More information available
• Stronger quantitative effects associated with
   human activity
 Size of network 
increases
• Stronger interaction between market actors
• More complex value-added chains
• Higher availability of information
• Larger scope for effects of human activity 
 Complexity 
increases
• Heterogeneous capabilities and needs of market actors;
   unequal distribution of resources
• Higher product diversity
• Varying availability of information
• Strong global variability of market effects
 Heterogeneity 
increases
• Intensifying interaction dynamics
• Faster change in production processes
• Increase in information density
• Faster propagation of effects of human activity;
   delays in  global distribution
 Dynamism 
increases
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opportunities. These drivers in turn are endogenous components of the 
system, and are themselves likewise governed by the global dynamic. The focal 
point for the emergence of global risks is ultimately the interplay of individual 
and institutional decisions under a given set of conditions. Herein lies a 
paradox: While the environment increases in complexity, the manner in which 
individual decisions are made in a given situation tends not to do so. This is 
because these decisions depend ultimately on actors’ brain structures, which 
change only marginally over time, at least if one assumes that the 
intergenerational evolution of the human brain is an extremely slow process.5  
On the one hand, this means that the capacity of single individuals to deal 
with complex situations requiring decisions has its limits. On the other, this 
insight also offers cause for hope: The better the functioning of the brain can 
be understood, and thus the behavior of people under specific circumstances, 
the better that situations that demand decisions can be modeled, analyzed and 
simulated.  
The “big picture” in which individual decisions are made depends 
substantially on decisions that are made institutionally, in the sense that 
multiple people are involved in an institutionalized decision-making process. 
These include fiscal policies, business strategies, or supranational finance 
market regulations. In contrast to the way individual decisions are made, 
institutional decisions can be deliberately shaped. To be sure, individual 
choices form the basis for institutional decisions, as individual persons are 
ultimately involved in the shaping process. However, the process of 
institutional decision-making can make available problem-solving capacities 
that single individuals cannot possess. Institutional decisions are distinguished 
by the fact that they are rooted in the surrounding environment’s social 
systems, such as organizations or cultures, rather than solely in the brain 
structures of the individuals involved. Although these environmental features 
 
5 At the same time, research shows that over the course of a full lifetime, the brain has a 
large, mostly untapped development potential that could be better exploited by new types 
of lifelong learning (Staudinger, Marsiske and Baltes 1995). 
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too possess a certain inertia, their underlying evolutionary processes are much 
faster than are their biological counterparts.  
Decision-making processes must adapt themselves to globalization’s 
growing complexity. The point of leverage here lies in the shaping of 
institutional decision-making processes, in which the potential for 
achievement is greater than the sum of the individual participants’ potential, 
and which as sociocultural structures (as opposed to physiological brain 
structure), are malleable. The bottom line is that the development of the global 
economy is significantly influenced by decisions made at the level of 
governments, central banks, international organizations and multinational 
corporations. These decisions also form the framework that encompasses 
most global risks6. However, many of the fundamental principles on which 
these institutional decisions depend are increasingly less appropriate within the 
complexity and dynamic shifts of the global economy. In what follows, we 
focus on four such challenges. 
The growth paradigm increasingly conflicts with the reality of globally limited 
resources, and no longer promotes well-being within post-industrial societies. 
Worldwide consumer demand, and thus resource requirements too, will climb 
rapidly in the years ahead. However, economic policy decisions relying wholly 
on economic growth are not indefinitely sustainable. On the one hand (at least 
under methods existing today), there is a limit to the amount that can be 
produced; on the other, the limited number of consumers and scarce time 
resources means that consumption cannot take place ad infinitum 7. But even as 
the possibility of unlimited growth is being called into question, so too is the 
concept’s basic sense. At a certain stage of growth, the contribution of 
 
6 This does not apply to risks of natural origin such as pandemics or natural disasters. 
Nevertheless, institutional decisions can in these areas too have an influence on the quality 
of preparedness and safeguards. 
7 However, the time horizons of an initially steady rise in consumer demand and any 
potential global consumer saturation differ substantially. This means that at least globally, a 
saturation point is unlikely to occur within the next few decades. 
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economic growth to the increase in people’s levels of satisfaction seems to 
drop sharply.  
Explanations and predictions offered by economic models are increasingly 
diverging from reality. Global amplification and feedback effects are enabling 
the development of phenomena such as the current financial crisis, which 
most economists failed to predict, and which even in retrospect has eluded 
convincing explanation within the framework of established economic 
theories. This is because central elements of traditional economics, such as the 
Homo economicus model, the efficient-market hypothesis, closed equilibrium 
systems or assumptions of homogeneity, do not account for aspects such as 
cognitive biases, information asymmetries, phase transitions with multiple 
unstable equilibria or heterogeneity. There is a risk that economic policy 
strategies will be based on theoretical assumptions that effectively blind 
policymakers to important aspects of reality. The global economy becomes 
more susceptible to risks as a result, and consequently more fragile.  
In many critical areas, the pursuit of short-term, local objectives leads neither to 
long-term nor globally advantageous results. In large systems, which to a large 
extent consist of unrelated individual components, global target values can be 
optimized by optimizing the corresponding values at the individual 
component level. With increasing complexity, however, this is less and less 
true: The welfare of people in one location depends ever more on the actions 
of other people at a distant location. Feedback effects associated with global 
interdependence lead to a divergence between short- and long-term goals, as 
well as between local and global targets.  
Decision-making processes are increasingly inadequate to deal with rising levels 
of complexity and uncertainty. Increasingly complex systems become 
increasingly difficult to control, and develop what can sometimes be 
dangerous internal dynamics. The worldwide interdependence of political, 
economic and social systems, technological change, and the interaction of 
diverse global forces in the Anthropocene era create explosively climbing 
complexity, with which human capabilities are increasingly less able to cope. 
Furthermore, as the complexity of the systems in which we interact increases, 
structural uncertainties also deepen, and we are often forced to make decisions 
despite having only incomplete information available.  
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In order to avoid sliding with ever greater frequency from one global crisis 
to the next, it appears essential to reconsider the bases for our decisions in a 
radical manner and address the corresponding challenges: 
 Solving the growth dilemma 
 Developing appropriate economic models 
 Developing new strategies and mechanisms for long-term and globally 
oriented action 
 Developing new decision-making processes able to deal with complex 
challenges 
In the next section, a number of future-oriented approaches show how 
these challenges can be met. 
Future-oriented approaches 
Solving the growth dilemma 
The first question is whether growth per se serves human purposes at all, 
and whether the economy could somehow function even without growth. This 
question goes to the heart of so-called post-growth economics (Jackson 2009, 
Paech 2005). The starting point is the recognition that peoples’ well-being – at 
least in the industrialized nations – has already become decoupled from 
economic growth (Frey 2008, Oswald 1997). At the same time, happiness 
research has reported that economic contractions, particularly heterogeneous 
cases that affect some people more strongly than others, strongly reduce 
people’s sense of well-being. It remains unclear how a transition towards an 
economy without growth might manifest itself.  
But even if continuous growth should prove essential for the economy, two 
fundamental constraints remain. On the production side, natural resources are 
globally limited, as the Club of Rome noted in its 1972 report “The Limits to 
Growth” and its subsequent updates (see Meadows et al. 1972, Meadows et al. 
2004). And on the expenditure side, consumption capacity is similarly 
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constrained by the number of consumers and the time available for 
consumption; these limits ultimately could lead to saturation and stagnation. 
Of course, these limitations are only for specific types of growth based on 
the consumption of resources, and in which additional time is spent in the 
process of consumption. Thus, several ways out lie close to hand: On the one 
hand, fewer resources could be depleted (through more efficient production 
or targeted reuse of materials), alternative resources used (such as renewable 
energy or nuclear fusion) and growth oriented increasingly toward goods and 
services that require no non-renewable resources. On the other hand, efforts 
could be made to create growth not through more goods and services, but 
through better ones. Specifically targeted support of research and innovation 
seems to provide a persistent foundation for promising alternatives. 
German process engineer Michael Braungart is of the opinion that the 
often-requested waiver is the wrong way to deal with production-side limits.8. 
Instead, he has proposed the “cradle-to-cradle” principle, which keeps the 
cycle of resources in balance through the reuse of materials (McDonough and 
Braungart 2002). The essential idea is to reuse raw materials after their 
processing and disposal, something that would require rethinking the design of 
processing and utilization processes.  
With the rise of the emerging markets in the coming years, global consumer 
demand will rise rapidly, ensuring that a point of global saturation will certainly 
not be reached for some time. Economic stagnation thus remains initially a 
problem primarily for the developed countries. Prominent approaches aimed 
at replacing gross national product as an indicator used to guide activity 
include the OECD’s Better Life Index and the work of the Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi Commission (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009), which has been used by 
the French government.9 
 
8 www.braungart.com/ 
9 www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org 
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New economic models 
In 1936, John Maynard Keynes wrote: “The extraordinary achievement of 
the classical theory was to overcome the beliefs of the ‘natural man’ and, at the 
same time, to be wrong” (Keynes 1936). Now, it is the nature of models to 
employ abstractions, in order to reduce complexity while simultaneously 
deriving useful explanations and predictions. However, global change 
increases the relevance of influential variables that are not included or are 
given too little weight within traditional economic models. The search for 
better models has shown that the inclusion of ideas from other disciplines 
such as psychology, physics or biology can be profitable, often at a 
metaphorical level. For example, econophysics aims at applying the concept of 
phase transitions to dynamic economic systems; from biology, the idea of 
evolution has entered economic discourse.  
In their book “Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the 
Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism” (Akerlof and Shiller 
2009), George Akerlof and Robert Shiller adopt Keynes’ idea that human 
activity is driven largely by “animal spirits” rather than by rational 
considerations, as is assumed within (neo)classical economic theory. Akerlof 
and Shiller cite five aspects of the “animal spirits” intrinsic to us: confidence 
and its multipliers, fairness, corruption and antisocial behavior, the money 
illusion, and stories that shape our understanding of the world. The authors – 
along with many other prominent economists – see the fact that standard 
economic theories wholly ignore these aspects of human nature as a core 
reason for the emergence of speculative bubbles (and hence also for the 
current financial crisis).  
In addition, former IBM Chief Technologist Gunter Dueck explains how 
basic human tendencies lead to overreaction and thus exacerbate alternating 
boom and bust phases; he argues that underlying emotional reactions should 
thus be taken quite seriously (Dueck 2006). And Herbert Gintis, an economist 
at the University of Massachusetts, the Santa Fe Institute and the Central 
European University in Budapest notes that the assumptions of the various 
scholarly disciplines that study human behavior in fact diverge strongly. He 
has called for a unification of these intellectual fundaments within the fields of 
economics, sociology, anthropology and psychology (Gintis 2009). 
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In his book “Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Failed and How to Repair 
It,” Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz deals repeatedly with the 
effects of failing to assume heterogeneity within the standard economic model, 
and notes in particular that the heterogeneity of expectations among market 
participants is a key contributor to systemic imbalance (Stiglitz 2011).  
The abundance of data available today (something that will increase even 
further in the future), along with the growing power of computers, for the first 
time offers the possibility to verify the validity of models on an empirical basis, 
and to use complex simulations to derive macroeconomic models from 
microeconomic principles – an idea that derives from the newly created area 
of agent-based computational economics (Tesfatsion and Judd 2006).  
The following table from “The Origin of Wealth,” (Beinhocker 2006) 
summarizes the main differences between “traditional economics” and a new 
theory of “complexity economics.”  
Having at hand all these new models and approaches, it is, however, critical 
to remember that rising levels of complexity will always ensure that some 
uncertainties remain. It appears important, therefore, to explore meta-level 
issues more deeply, such as where the ability to model reaches its limits, and 
what useful conclusions can be drawn for dealing with the consequent 
uncertainty. 
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Table 2: Traditional economics and complexity economics compared (Beinhocker 2006, 
Table 4-1) 
 
 
 
New strategies for long-term and globally oriented action 
The world economy is becoming increasingly irreducible, insofar as global 
problems are less amenable to solution though being broken into their local 
components and solved on an individual basis. Examples include collective 
CO2 emissions that exacerbate global climate change, or trade wars that arise 
because individual states put their selfish short-term interests ahead of long-
    Traditional economics     Complexity economics
Dynamic  • Closed, static, linear, systems
    in equilibrium
• Open, dynamic, non-linear,
    systems not in equilibrium
Actors  • Collectively modeled
• Make decisions using complex
   deductive calculations
• Comprehensively informed
• Failure- and bias-free
• No learning or adaptation
   requirements
• Individually modeled
• Make decisions using inductive
   rules of thumb
• Incompletely informed
• Prone to bias
• Capable of learning and
   adaptation
Structure
of ties
 • Modeled on the basis of actors’
   indirect interactions through
   market mechanisms
• Modeled on the basis of direct
   interactions between individual
   actors
Emergence  •  Micro- and macroeconomics
    remain separate
• Micro- and macroeconomics
   are linked
• Macro-level models are emergent
   results of interactions at micro
   level 
Evolution  • No mechanism for renewal of
   the system or increase in order
   and complexity
• Evolution process based on
   selection, mutation and
   amplification provides for
   renewal of the system and the
   increase in order and complexity
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term global solutions. In such a rapidly changing world, however, the danger 
arises that the fastest possible answers to daily events will be given ever-greater 
priority, while long-term consequences will drop from view.  
Individual preferences provide a starting point in addressing this dilemma. 
In classical economic theory, the market’s “invisible hand” enables actors’ self-
interested pursuit of profit to lead to the optimum macroeconomic state. 
However, individual decisions do have an effect on uninvolved market 
participants, through what are called externalities. These are external costs or 
external benefits which the market price does not – or at least does not 
sufficiently – take into account. Internalization is possible through the use of 
regulatory instruments such as the trading of certificates (for example, 
emissions or debt allowances) or the taxation of activities that cause 
externalities. In order for these instruments to be effective with regard to 
global externalities, they must be enforced at the global level, which is a major 
challenge due to the lack of global governance structures. In addition, it is 
often difficult or virtually impossible to quantify externalities in monetary 
terms. In the case of long-term externalities, this is made particularly difficult 
by complexities, uncertainties and inconsistent time preferences.  
In addition, there are alternatives to market mechanisms that produce fewer 
externalities and are more efficient, wasting fewer resources. Nobel 
prizewinner Elinor Ostrom, an expert on environmental economics, has 
shown that so-called commons problems, in which there is a danger of 
depletion of freely available resources, are in certain contexts better solved by 
cooperative self-organization than by the market and state action (Ostrom 
1990). Economist Peter Barnes has suggested the establishment of so-called 
commons trusts in order to facilitate a more equitable and sustainable usage of 
common goods (Barnes 2006). 
New decision-making processes for dealing with complex challenges 
One of the central insights of cybernetics is the “law of requisite variety,” 
also known as “Ashby’s law” (Ashby 1956). This states that as more 
possibilities for action are available to a system’s control mechanism, the 
better able it is to compensate for increases in the number of potential failure 
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points (and thus for greater complexity). In short: Handling complex systems 
can only be performed successfully through the use of processes that are 
themselves complex. It is thus advisable to approach complex challenges with 
strategies that are sufficiently complex.  
The most complex problem-solving tool available to us is the human brain. 
Particularly in the subconscious elements of the brain, many experiences are 
processed in such a way as to form the basis of evaluations, which in turn 
enable very complex problems encountered later to be decided quickly. For 
this reason, in periods of stable conditions, intuition and gut feelings often 
function surprisingly well. Problems arise, however, if conditions change 
abruptly. In periods of change, reliance on the intuition of individual decision 
makers is a risky proposition. As social scientist and Nobel economics 
prizewinner Herbert Simon writes in “Models of Bounded Rationality”: “The 
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is 
very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required 
for objectively rational behavior in the real world – or even for a reasonable 
approximation to such objective rationality” (Simon 1982). This argument is 
given weight by the insight drawn from brain research that “objectively 
rational behavior” is in any case an illusion produced by the cortex – the brain 
region responsible for rational decisions – “after limbic structures and 
functions have already determined what is to be done,” as biologist and 
neuroscientist Gerhard Roth says (Roth 2003).  
Conventional theories and processes too founder when confronted with the 
increasing complexity associated with globalization, and with the increases in 
the speed of development and information exchange associated with 
technological progress. As a result, even experts are often left perplexed, while 
decision makers find themselves overwhelmed and bereft of clear direction. 
If the growing complexity has overwhelmed existing decision-making 
mechanisms, two possibilities exist: either to reduce the complexity with the 
help of other instruments, or devise new mechanisms that are better adapted 
to the complexity. Vast computing power can today be applied to the task of 
reducing complexity. Moreover, a huge amount of data is available for analysis 
and knowledge extraction, while highly complex simulations enable the 
discovery of fundamental patterns and the creation of comprehensive 
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forecasts. Current examples include the IBM Smarter Planet Initiative 10 or the 
FuturICT project which, though still in the planning phase, aims at large-scale 
simulations of social systems 11.  
Another form of complexity reduction is the visual representation of data, 
which has become the task of the relatively new field of data-driven 
journalism. Through the open and vivid presentation of data and facts, one of 
the basic conditions for dealing with complexity – transparency of 
dependencies – is fulfilled. Such efforts are currently being promoted by the 
open data movement.  
However, the automated reduction of complexities also has limits, as 
ascertaining the character of complex interdependencies is often impossible, a 
hurdle that in turn hinders the production of valid predictions. In such cases, a 
fundamentally different approach to dealing with future challenges must be 
found. This includes both the assessment of future risks, a task that no longer 
appears possible using statistical methods and rational expectations theory, 
and the preparation for several possible futures whose probabilities are not 
quantifiable. Scenario planning techniques and other methods of futures 
research could gain in importance as providing the foundations for decisions. 
Dealing with fundamental uncertainty as opposed to calculable risks is an 
increasingly urgent challenge, and one which has not yet been explored deeply 
enough from a structural perspective.  
With respect to new mechanisms, intelligent decision-making architectures 
are required. Networking is a key factor within this area. The Internet offers a 
valuable opportunity to share knowledge around the world, engage many 
people in conversation and draw on collective intelligence (Surowiecki 2004). 
The potential inherent in information and communications technologies 
extends well beyond majority decisions, average ratings and the endless 
comment threads in online forums; the intelligent analysis of social networks, 
 
10 www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/de/de/ 
11 www.futurict.eu/ 
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elaborated discussion and evaluation platforms, and the automatic semantic 
processing of large-scale texts are on the way.  
In their book “Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness,” economists Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein write about 
decision architectures, and propose their concept of “libertarian paternalism” 
as a guiding principle in designing processes (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). The 
idea is to guarantee actors the largest possible freedom of choice, while at the 
same time “nudging” them toward deciding in a (societally) desirable manner. 
Global rethinking required 
The above-noted challenges to the foundations of global decision-making 
give rise to a whole series of fundamental questions: 
 To what extent does a market economic system – particularly in a highly 
complex society with a global division of labor – need economic growth in 
order to function? 
 How might economic incentives for sustainable growth look? How might 
growth and resource use be decoupled? 
 What are the “correct” microeconomic foundations on which to construct 
macroeconomic models? 
 How can systems be made resilient? How can they be both robust and 
adaptable? 
 Are local redistribution mechanisms enough, or do we need globally 
managed redistribution? What normative principles should be used to 
decide which distribution of resources is globally just? How might 
processes that produce these principles look? Are there realistic 
alternatives to compensatory redistribution, perhaps in the form of 
business models that automatically respond better to heterogeneous 
environments and produce “fairer” output distributions ?  
 What significance might be held by new mechanisms that fall outside the 
spectrum traditionally bounded by the market and planned economies? 
How can these be brought to scale?  
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 Which problems can be solved by “relocalization,” and which cannot? 
Where is global governance necessary, and how can it be effectively 
designed?  
 How can externalities at the global level be internalized (on a politically 
practical basis)? What mechanisms already in place enable the pursuit of 
global and long-term goals? How can limited resources in particular be 
priced in conformity with market principles, and how can inconsistent 
time preferences be factored in?  
 What would it look like to create networked knowledge and decision-
making systems that enable a new level of quality in dealing with complex 
systems, thanks to the intelligent combination of individual human 
capacities and available information? What role can the Internet play in 
this process?  
 How can today’s data processing capacities and advanced algorithms help 
to create complex solutions that match the growing complexities of 
problems?  
 What new approaches to risk assessment and futures planning are 
emerging? How can fundamental uncertainty be dealt with in a systematic 
way? 
Scientific engagement with the challenges described above is still in its 
infancy, and remains far from being regarded as “mainstream.” Some latent 
awareness that the classic foundations for decision-making must be 
fundamentally overhauled does exist today within scholarly, political and civil-
society circles, but remains very shallow and weak. The lack of ideas on how 
to proceed and the focus on more immediately pressing phenomena make a 
fundamental examination of these issues difficult.  
While the identification of future-oriented approaches itself is no easy task, 
the next challenge will be to translate such ideas from academia into policy 
and economic practice. This is particularly true in those areas where global 
management is required, but no corresponding global structures suitable to the 
task are in place.  
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In addition, it is important to find new ways of dealing with risks, since – as 
described above – these are qualitatively changing. Linear, individual case 
studies are of increasingly less help. The rational assumption that a risk can be 
sufficiently precisely characterized through its probability of occurrence and 
potential for damage no longer holds in a networked, heterogeneous world; 
this is because the significance of other risk dimensions – the distribution of 
potential damage, irreversibility, and so on – has risen, and because the high 
level of complexity and uncertainty often renders probability and potential 
damage unquantifiable. The future will likely be characterized by increasingly 
unpredictable discontinuities, and we must find ways to deal with it by making 
our economic and social order accordingly resistant. 
Already today, behavioral and evolutionary economics, statistical physics, 
the emerging interdisciplinary science of complex systems, and new agent-
based models are contributing to a better understanding of the global 
economic order. The crucial question for the years ahead will be whether and 
how researchers’ ideas will show up in the shaping of finance and economic 
policy, and whether this will succeed in developing a sustainable global 
economic and social model able to minimize risks, resist crises and give future 
generations the opportunity to lead a fulfilled life on our planet. As Yann 
Arthus-Bertrand says so strikingly in closing his documentary “Home”: “It’s 
too late to be a pessimist.” 
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